Materials for a 4-Part On-Line Course on Global Financial Governance Offered by United Nations Institute on Training and Research (UNITAR) by Bradlow, Daniel
American University Washington College of Law




Materials for a 4-Part On-Line Course on Global
Financial Governance Offered by United Nations
Institute on Training and Research (UNITAR)
Daniel Bradlow
American University Washington College of Law, bradlow@wcl.american.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/fac_works_papers
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Works at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bradlow, Daniel David, Materials for a 4-Part On-Line Course on Global Financial Governance Offered by United Nations Institute on
Training and Research (UNITAR) (Fall 2009). UNITAR, On-Line Training Courses in Public Finance and Trade, 2009
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1488020
 
 
American University Washington College of Law 
 




MATERIALD FOR A 4-PART-ON-LINE COURSE ON GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE OFFERED BY UNITED NATIONS 
















This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1488020
1 
 
Materials for a 4-Part  On-line Course on Global Financial Governance 
Offered by United Nations Institute on Training and Research (UNITAR)
1
 




Module 1:   A Framework for Understanding International Financial Governance  
 
 
I. Introduction to Course on International Financial Governance 
 
This course has two objectives. The first is to help participants understand international financial 
governance and the challenges that it faces. Second, it seeks to aid participants in assessing both 
the impact the current arrangements for international financial governance have on their 
countries and regions and the options they may have in responding to the challenges this creates 
for them.  The course will have succeeded if it provides participants with both an intellectual 
framework that they can use to evaluate the current arrangements for international financial 
governance and any proposals for changing these arrangements, and knowledge about the 
purposes, structures and functions of the existing arrangements for international financial 
governance.  
 
The course consists of four modules. The first module, entitled ―A Framework for Understanding 
International Financial Governance’ discusses a set of general principles with which, it is 
suggested, all arrangements for international financial governance should comply. It is designed 
to provide participants with the intellectual tools they need for understanding and evaluating 
international financial governance arrangements.  
 
The second module, entitled ―The Global Financial System’s Institutional Arrangements‖ 
provides an overview of the key institutions involved in governing the global financial and 
monetary system. This module will describe the structure and purposes of these regulatory 
institutions.  
 
The third module, entitled, ―The Functions of International Financial Governance‖, provides an 
overview of the functions and substantive work of these global institutions.  
 
The fourth module, ―Reforming Global Financial Governance‖, discusses the various proposals 
and recent efforts aimed at reforming global financial governance.  
 
It is important for participants to note that each module is designed to be self-contained. This 
means that the reader should be able to gain a good understanding of the institutional 
arrangements of international financial governance by reading only the text of all four modules, 
without referring to any of the references cited in the module. This is done to ensure that the 
course is useful both to those with unlimited access to internet sources and to libraries and to 
those who do not have such access. One consequence of this approach is that it is not possible to 
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provide comprehensive information on all the institutions, both global and regional, that are 
involved in some way in international financial governance. To do so, would require much 
longer assignments than it is reasonable to expect participants to read in a four-week on-line 
course. Consequently, the course will provide participants with an overview of the types of 
institutions involved in international financial governance and with an understanding of the 
substantive work that they do relating to international financial governance. The modules will 
also provide readers with references from which they can learn more about other organizations 
and entities discussed in this course.  
 
II. Introduction to Module 1: General Principles Applicable to International Financial 
Governance 
 
International financial governance should have two objectives. The first is to support an 
international monetary system that is predictable and stable and that facilitates payments for 
international economic transactions. The second is to oversee an international financial system 
that both protects the interests of savers and investors around the world and allocates credit 
efficiently and fairly amongst all potential borrowers. Effective international financial 
governance, thus, should facilitate productive and sustainable economic activity that serves the 
interests of all stakeholders in the international economic order.    
 
Any arrangements for international financial governance will only effectively achieve the 
requisite objectives if they conform to the following five sets of principles: an holistic approach 
to development, comprehensive coverage, respect for applicable international law, coordinated 
specialization, and good administrative practice. 
 
A. Holistic approach to development 
 
All states are developing states in the sense that they are striving to create better lives for their 
citizens, however they understand this concept. Thus, a key test for the international financial 
architecture is how effectively it supports the efforts of participating states to achieve their 
common developmental objective.  It follows that one standard for assessing international 
financial governance is the vision of ―development‖ that informs its arrangements and activities. 
 
The original vision of development as an economic process that focuses on growth, as measured 
by GDP per capita is no longer seen as sufficient because it is now recognized that the level of 
development of both individuals and societies can be positively or negatively affected by a range 
of non-economic factors.
3
  This insight has led to a new understanding of development as being a 
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comprehensive and holistic process that involves inter-twined economic, environmental, social, 
cultural, political and even ethical dimensions. According to this view, the economic aspects of 
development cannot be separated from its social, political, environmental and cultural aspects, all 
of which are components of one dynamically integrated process.   
 
The extent to which the international financial governance arrangements incorporate this holistic 
vision of development determines how well the arrangements can account for all the economic, 
financial, environmental, social, cultural and political implications of the international financial 
system and, thus, how effectively it helps all states in the international system achieve their 
developmental objective.  
 
B. Comprehensive coverage 
 
The principle of comprehensive coverage holds that the mechanisms and institutions of 
international financial governance should be applicable to all stakeholders in the international 
financial system and should deal with all the methods, institutional arrangements, and 
instruments they use in their financial operations
4
. This means that the mechanism of 
international financial governance need to be concerned with all the activities and operations of 
all financial intermediaries that engage in cross border financial transactions, large corporate and 
sovereign investors and borrowers that utilize a broad range of complex financial instruments, 
financial actors who wish to base their financial transactions, both as savers and investors, on 
religious principles, small local financial institutions that operate only in local markets and are 
engaged in transactions that involve small and medium size enterprises, community based 
businesses and local farming operations, and with  micro-credit and other financial 
intermediaries that are concerned with the problems of poverty and expanding access to financial 




There are three important corollaries that follow from the principle of comprehensive coverage. 
First, the mechanisms of international financial governance must be sufficiently flexible and 
dynamic that they can adapt to the changing needs and activities of their diverse stakeholders. 
For example, as the ―top end‖ large scale financial institutions develop new financial 
instruments, and new arrangements through which to conduct their operations, the international 
financial architecture must have the capacity to understand these instruments and arrangements 
and to determine how to most effectively account for them and their impacts on the various 
stakeholders in the international financial system. At the same time the international financial 
architecture must be able to accommodate the changing needs of the ―low end‖ small and micro 
financial institutions.  
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Second, the totality of international financial governance arrangements must ensure that the 
international community receives all the services it requires from a well functioning global 
financial system. These services are: a global lender of last resort, global monetary regulation, 
global development finance; regulation of trade and investment in financial services; global 
regulation of the cross border activity of financial institutions; coordination of national financial 
regulation, including ensuring that all financial regulation promotes such issues as access to 
financial services for all (individuals, corporate entities, and states); coordinated taxation of 
financial transactions; arrangements for dealing with sovereign debt problems and complex cross 
border financial institution and corporate bankruptcies; and regulation of international money 
laundering.    
 
The third corollary, which is intended to ensure that the international financial architecture is 
flexible, efficient and not unduly centralized, is the principle of subsidiarity
5
. This principle 
holds that all decisions should be taken at the lowest level in the system compatible with 
effective decision making. Thus, the principle would require that global financial governance 
arrangements encourage national or even sub-national decision making to the greatest extent 
possible, consistent with effective decision making and implementation.  This principle is 
particularly important in international financial governance because of the diversity of interests 
of its many stakeholders and because so many of its stakeholders have only local or regional 
interests, as opposed to global ones.  It is however a complicated principle to implement because 
it must apply both in standard operating conditions and in crisis situations, which may require 
that decisions are made at a different level than is the case during standard conditions.  In 
addition, it needs to be linked to a conflict resolution mechanism that is capable of resolving 
disputes between regulators at different levels as to which level is the most appropriate for 
resolving a particular issue 
 
The principle of comprehensive coverage therefore establishes a second test which global 
financial arrangements must satisfy. They must be able to demonstrate that they have both the 
technical expertise and the mandate to address the concerns of all the stakeholders in the 
international financial system and that they have the capacity to adapt as the interests and actions 
of these stakeholders evolve over time. It is important to recognize that this does not mean that 
all these issues must be dealt with by the global mechanisms themselves, but it does mean that 
they have some mechanism for ensuring that these interests are addressed at the appropriate level 
in the system and that learning and information on best practices in this regard is shared within 
the system.  
 
C. Respect for applicable international law 
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The institution arrangements for international financial governance, either because they are 
formal international organizations created by treaty or through the participation of sovereign 
states in their decision making, should comply with applicable international legal principles.
6
  
While international law does not provide detailed standards that are applicable to specific 
international financial affairs, it does provide the general principles that should guide the 
institutional arrangements for international financial governance. In particular, this means that 
the decision-making bodies and institutions that comprise international financial governance 
should conform to universally applicable customary and treaty based international legal 
principles. There are four sets of principles that are applicable in this regard.  
 






The first is the principle of respect for national sovereignty. It is clear that by participating in a 
global governance arrangement, states are agreeing to forego some level of national 
independence in order to reap the benefits of a well-functioning international system. Given the 
different power and wealth characteristics of the participating states, it follows that, de facto, the 
amount of independence they give up will be positively related to their power and wealth. 
However, the principle of national sovereignty should still provide them with the means for 
preserving as much independence and policy space as is practicable and consistent with the 




The second is the general principle of non- discrimination. This means that the institutions of 
international financial governance should treat all similarly situated states and individuals in the 
same way. This inevitably means that there will be disparate treatment for differently situated 
states and individuals.  The key question thus becomes what standards can be used to ensure that 
all stakeholders receive treatment that is fair and reasonable.  
 
The first standard applicable to the treatment of states is that the institutions of global 
governance, like the IMF, should treat similarly situated states similarly and differently situated 
states differently. This means that while they should base their treatment of all states on the same 
principles, they should apply these principles in a way that is responsive to the different 
situations of each member state. Their treatment of non-state stakeholders should be based on the 
same approach.  
 
Second, it means that recognition should be given to the fact that weaker and poorer states are 
significantly different in capacities from rich and powerful nations. One way of implementing 
this principle could be to apply the general principle of special and differential treatment that is 
applicable in a number of international legal contexts, for example in international environmental 
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and international trade law, to international financial governance. In the international financial 
context, this principle would ensure both that weak and poor countries are given access to 
financing on easier terms than may otherwise be applicable and that special attention is paid to 
ensuring that they are able to enjoy a meaningful level of participation in international financial 
decision making structures, even when they are based on principles like weighted voting.  A 
consequence to this may be that the organization offers some mechanism of accountability to 
these states and their citizens to compensate for any participation deficit.  
 
In the case of natural persons, the relevant principles should be derived from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which many now consider to be part of customary international 
law
8
. Pursuant to this document, it would seem that individuals have some right to expect that the 
principles and institutions of international financial governance, including national regulatory 
bodies, respect their rights to housing, health care, education, jobs, and social security. The 
institutions of international financial governance should also respect their rights to freedom of 
speech and association. Thus, one indicator of good financial governance could be the level of 
respect that the institutions of international financial governance show for human rights in their 




The third set of international legal principles applicable to international financial governance 
deals with the responsibility of states for the functioning of the financial system. Based on 
general principles of state responsibility
9
, they have an obligation to provide foreign legal 
persons, including financial institutions, which are present in the state, either through an 
investment or an individual transaction with fair and non-discriminatory treatment.  This means 
that these foreign entities should receive comparable treatment to similarly situated domestic 
institutions. It does not necessarily mean that they should receive the same treatment as all 
domestic financial institutions, regardless of their size or role in the domestic financial system.  
 
International environmental law 
 
A fourth set of applicable international legal principles are derived from international 
environmental law
10
. At a minimum these principles would impose on financial regulators an 
obligation to insist that financial institutions fully understand the environmental and social 
impacts of their financial practices and of individual transactions. This is particularly relevant, 
given the potential impact that environmental events such as climate change, can have on 
financial risk and visa versa. This suggests that international financial governance should be 
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working to ensure that the financial system promotes environmentally sustainable practices and 
minimizes the incentives for financial actors to engage in environmentally risky behaviour.  
 
The principle of respect for applicable international  law establishes a third test for international 
financial governance, namely to what extent do the arrangements for international financial 
governance promote respect for national sovereignty, the environment, and the rights of all 
natural and legal stakeholders in the international financial system.  
 
D. Coordinated specialization 
 
The principle of coordinated specialization acknowledges that, even though development is 
holistic and all aspects of international governance are inter-connected, international financial 
governance cannot function efficiently without a limited mandate and without the officials in 
these institutions having the requisite technical expertise to implement these mandates. Thus, the 
principle of coordinated specialization has two requirements. First, the mandate of the 
mechanisms and institutions of international financial governance must be clearly defined and 
limited to international monetary and financial affairs. Second, the institutions of international 
financial governance cannot ignore the other important aspects of the development process. 
Consequently, there is a need to ensure some form of coordination between the institutions and 
mechanisms of international financial governance and other organizations and arrangements for 
global governance. The coordinating mechanism, if it is to effectively resolve tensions between 
the different aspects of international governance, needs to be transparent and predictable. It may 
also need some dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
This principle, therefore, establishes a fourth standard for measuring the adequacy of 
international financial governance. This standard is that the mechanisms of international 
financial governance must have both specialized mandates and a means for coordinating their 
policies and operations with other institutions of global governance, each of which has its own 
limited mandate. This means that the institutions of global financial governance must offer other 
institutions of global governance a meaningful opportunity to raise concerns with them and that 
there must be some mechanism for resolving tensions between the different specialized 
mechanisms of global governance.   
 
E. Good administrative practices11 
 
The basic principles of good administrative practice in global governance are the same as those 
applicable to any public institution. These principles are transparency, predictability, 
participation, reasoned decision making, and accountability.  This means that all the institutions 
of international financial governance must conduct their operations in a manner that is 
sufficiently open that their procedures, decisions, and actions are predictable and understandable 
to all stakeholders. They must also offer these stakeholders some meaningful way of raising their 
concerns and having them addressed by the institutions. The institutions should also be required 
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to explain their decisions and operations to all interested stakeholders. Finally, the stakeholders 
should be able to hold the institutions accountable for their decisions and actions.  
 
Thus, the final standard against which international financial governance arrangements can be 
measured is the extent to which it complies with the five principles of good administrative 
practice stated above. 
 
Summary of the standards for evaluating arrangements for international financial governance 
 
The five standards that can be used for assessing the adequacy of any international financial 
governance arrangements are:  
1) Are the arrangements based on a holistic understanding of development and how do they 
incorporate this vision? 
2) Do the arrangements for international financial governance deal, at an appropriate level 
in the system, with all the stakeholders and all the policy and regulatory issues relevant to 
the functioning of the international financial system and do they have the capacity to 
adapt to the changing interests and concerns of these stakeholders?  
3) Do the mechanisms for international financial governance comply with all applicable 
international law standards, including respect for national sovereignty, the rights of all 
natural and legal persons, and responsible environmental law practices?  
4) How do the institutions of international financial governance interact with other global 
governance institutions? 
5) Do the institutions and mechanisms for international financial governance comply with 
the five principles of good administrative practice: transparency, predictability, 
participation, reasoned decision making, and accountability? 
 
 
Module 2:  The Global Financial System’s Institutional Arrangements 







The focus of this module is on the many organizations that play a role in the regulation of the 
global financial system. It seeks to ensure that the reader gains an understanding of both the 
general institutional arrangements for global financial governance and of some of the key  
entities in the governance arrangements. In order to achieve this objective, the module is divided 
into four sections.  
 
The first section is a brief discussion of the reasons for the complexity of the current institutional 
arrangements for international financial governance. The second section is devoted to a general 
discussion of the different categories of institutional actors involved in global financial 
regulation. The third section is a brief overview of the institutional arrangements for regional 
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monetary and financial governance. The final section is a brief summary of the key points of this 
module and a conclusion.  
 
It is important to note that, given the complexity of the subject and the relatively large number of 
entities involved in global financial governance, it is not possible for this module to be a 
comprehensive discussion of the institutional arrangements for global financial governance. 
Readers who are interested in such a discussion should refer to the websites cited in this module 
and to the sources in the short bibliography at the end of the module.   
 
II. The Complex Arrangements for Regulation of the Global Financial System 
 
The institutional arrangements for global financial governance involve numerous different 
institutions. There are organizations, like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
Group, the Bank for International Settlements and the World Trade Organization, that have 
specialized mandates relating to international monetary affairs, international financial regulation, 
the development of financial markets, and the allocation of financing for development.  Entities 
like the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Association 
of Insurance Administrators are involved in coordinating national regulators from around the 
world with responsibilities for regulating specific sectors of the financial industry. There are also 
entities, like the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board that 
coordinate regulators from specific sets of countries. In addition, there are groups of countries, 
like the G10 and the G24, that seek to advance the interests of certain countries in particular 
international financial organizations; and other country groupings, like the G8 or the G20, that 
aspire to manage the global economy. Despite this plethora of institutions, there is no mechanism 
that has the specific mandate to either effectively coordinate these entities and resolve conflicts 
between them or to ensure that all issues relating to international financial governance are 
adequately addressed.  
 
Given the relative incoherence in international financial governance, it is important for readers to 
understand the system and how it has evolved. This in turn will help readers assess the potential 
for changing the system. There are four key points to consider in thinking about  how the system 
has evolved.  
  
First, there is a mismatch between the global operations of financial institutions and markets and 
the national focus of financial regulators. For example, JPMorganChase, the US financial 
company, manages its international network of branches and subsidiaries as a global operation 
that can serve its customers anywhere in the world.  However, each aspect of its business is 
regulated by a different national regulator. Since it is a US company, the parent company and the 
US part of the operations are regulated by the US financial regulators. Its various subsidiaries are 
regulated by the national authorities in their countries of incorporation and, to the extent they are 
consolidated into the parent company, may be subject to some US oversight. Its branches will be 
regulated by both the company’s home country regulators and the branch’s host country 
regulators. This makes it very difficult for any one national regulator to have a clear 




It should be noted regulators are aware of this tension between the de facto global scope of 
operations of large financial companies and national regulation and seek to address it by 
promoting international coordination between national regulators. However, these efforts are 
complicated by the fact that the international legal order is still based on the principle of 
sovereignty, which limits the ability of the international community to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of sovereign states.  This means that any attempt to establish a global financial regulatory 
regime needs to respect the fact that each state has the power to regulate its own monetary and 
financial system and strives to preserve as much space as possible to make its own financial and 
monetary policy.  
 
It follows from the above that there is no global institution that has the authority or the mandate 
to impose a unified regulatory regime on the global financial system and on all financial 
institutions without the consent of the participating states. One consequence of this situation is 
that regulation of the financial industry is a mix of national regulatory regimes and efforts at the 
international and regional level to coordinate these national regulatory schemes. In addition, 
while there may be similarities, even significant ones, between the regulations in different 
countries, they are not identical and are not interpreted and implemented in the same way. This 
creates opportunities for financial institutions to exploit the differences in regulation between 
countries by structuring themselves and their transactions so that they are subject to the 
regulatory regime they find most congenial, a phenomenon known as ―regulatory arbitrage‖. It 
can also influence governments to create regulatory regimes that are attractive to financial 
institutions in the hope of attracting them to their country so that their people can benefits from 
the jobs and revenues that they generate. This is one reason for the existence of tax and banking 
havens. 
 
Second, the key global financial regulatory bodies were created by those countries that had the 
greatest interest in having internationally coordinated financial regulation and policy. This means 
that they were created largely by the richest countries because they are the countries with global 
financial markets and that have the largest number of financial institutions operating globally.  
The result is that global financial regulatory arrangements tend to be biased in their favour either 
through their governance arrangements or their membership. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund operates on the basis of a system of weighted voting that favours the richer and 
more powerful member countries. Similarly, membership in the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision, the primary international entity for coordinating banking regulation, is limited to a 
small group of countries even though its policy recommendations can influence all countries.  As 
a consequence, the focus of these regulatory institutions tends to be on the concerns of the rich 
countries and their financial institutions. They pay less attention to the regulatory challenges of 
poor countries, which are more concerned with small financial institutions operating in a 
challenging developmental environment than with large global financial institutions, and with 
enhancing the access of poor people to finance than with enhancing transparency in capital 
markets.  
 
Third, the current institutional arrangements for regulation of the global financial system have 
evolved in response to problems and crises that have occurred since the Second World War 
rather than through careful design. When confronted with serious financial and regulatory 
problems, the powerful states have either tended to use the means that they find most convenient 
11 
 
within the existing framework of institutions or have created a new mechanism to deal with the 
problem. For example, in response to the sovereign debt crises of the 1980s, the rich and 
powerful countries, acting on the assumption that a key cause of the crises was the policies of the 
debtor countries themselves, delegated the lead role in managing the crisis to the IMF, even 
though this was arguably not part of its original mandate. Its response to the Asian crises of the 
1990s, on the other hand, was based on the assumption that failure of financial regulation was a 
primary cause of the problems. Consequently, they created the Financial Stability Forum, in 
which the financial regulatory authorities of the G7 countries could meet with representatives 
from some key international financial bodies to coordinate their regulatory efforts. The result is 
the complex set of institutional arrangements that make up our current system of global financial 
governance. 
 
This point highlights the contingent nature of the existing governance arrangements. This means 
that the current institutions are dynamic and their structures and mandates can change over time. 
The precise path of their evolution will depend on changing power relations in the world, and on 
future financial and economic events.  It also explains both the relatively large number of 
institutions that exist at the global level and the overlaps and gaps that exist in the system. 
 
Fourth, the scope of global financial regulation has been narrowly defined to only apply to 
questions of prudential regulation of financial institutions and their market operations. It does not 
include any broader policy issues even if they may or are likely to have significant financial 
governance implications. Thus two of the biggest challenges facing the international community 
are not well integrated into international financial governance.  Environmental factors, 
particularly climate change, can have a significant impact on financial risk but they are not 
currently included in most financial regulatory frameworks. Similarly, little attention is paid to 
the relationship between finance and poverty even though this can influence both financial risk 
and prudent governance of financial systems.  
 
III. Overview of Key Global Financial Regulatory Institutions. 
 
The various institutions involved in global financial regulation can be divided into three 
categories. First, there are organizations that have their own independent legal identity and 
specific mandates relating to international financial regulation. Examples are the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)
13
 and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
14
. Second, there are 
entities which bring together regulators of financial markets and financial institutions so that they 
can consider matters of common interest and develop common approaches to the regulation of 
the global financial system. The entities in this group include the Financial Stability Board
15
, the 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
16
, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions
17
; the International Association of Insurance Administrators
18
; the International 


















; and the Financial Action Task Force.
20
 Third, there are those 
mechanisms that bring together small groups of powerful countries to discuss matters of 
common interest, including global financial governance issues. These mechanisms include the 
G7, the G20. This category also includes groupings, like the G10 and the G24
21
, that seek to 
advance the interests of specific groupings of countries within a particular governance 
institution, in this case the IMF
22
. Each category is discussed in general in more detail below and 
a representative body from each category is described. 
 
A. International Organizations Involved in Regulating the Global Financial System 
 
The institutions in this category are international organizations with specialized mandates that 
are relevant to the global financial system. They include the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank Group
23
, the World Trade Organization
24
 and the regional development banks.  The 
IMF is the international organization responsible for overseeing the international monetary 
system and ensuring that we have a stable system of exchange rates. As a result of this mandate, 
it has come to play a role in the oversight of the global financial system.  It also plays a role in 
helping its member states enhance the regulation of their financial systems so that they are more 
compatible with international standards. The World Bank Group is an international development 
financing group. As a result it plays a role in allocating international credit and in assisting 
countries to gain access to international finance.  The conditions it attaches to its financing may 
also result in the borrowing states adopting certain financial regulatory policies and measures. 
For example, it may give a country a loan to improve the financial sector in the country, with one 
condition of the loan being to introduce new financial regulations that are more consistent with 
international best practice. It also plays a role in helping its member states develop capital 
markets. In addition, the World Bank Group offers its member states technical advice that can 
help them enhance their capacity to regulate and manage their financial systems.  The regional 




 and the Inter-American Development 
Banks
27
 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
28
, perform similar 
functions to the World Bank Group but at a regional level.  
 
The World Trade Organization, because it has a mandate to promote trade in services, helps 
develop international financial markets.  In particular, it is the body in which arrangements 
relating to the terms and conditions for foreign access to national financial markets are discussed 
and agreements reached. These agreements then influence the structure and conduct of 
international financial markets.  
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The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is another organization that plays a significant role 
in international financial governance.  This entity was originally established by the victorious 
allies in the First World War to manage the payment of German war reparations. The functions 
of the BIS, which has 55 central banks as members, are to promote international monetary and 
financial cooperation and serve as a bank for central banks. The BIS fulfils the first part of its 
mandate by being a forum for discussion and analysis among central banks and within the 
international financial community; and by conducting economic and monetary research. The 
heads of the key central banks in the world meet regularly at the BIS to discuss matters of mutual 
interest. The BIS is also the host of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, whose 
membership consists of the banking regulators from the major banking and financial jurisdictions 
in the world. Its banking functions include acting as a counterparty for central banks in their 
financial transactions and as an agent or trustee in their international financial operations.
29
    
 
It is important to note that these organizations have their own independent legal identities and 
thus operate independently of their member states. This means that they are able to enter into 
their own contractual and other arrangements and can be held responsible for their actions 
independently of the member states.  Each of these organizations derive their mandates from 
international treaties establishing the organization. All of them, except the BIS (to which only 
central banks or monetary authorities belong), are inter-governmental organizations. In each 
organization the member states or central banks agree to conform to the requirements of 
membership as set out in the founding treaty. If a member state fails to comply with the 
obligations of membership, it can be denied both access to the benefits of membership and can 
incur international responsibility for the consequences of this failure.   
 
The most significant of these organizations in terms of global financial governance is the IMF. 






i. Membership and Voting 
 
The International Monetary Fund was established in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference as 
an international monetary institution to which all sovereign states could belong.  In practice this 
means that any state that is a member of the United Nations can join the IMF. It currently has 
186 member states, with the most prominent non-member states being Cuba and North Korea.  
 
Each member state, upon joining the IMF, is assigned a quota. The quota that the new member 
state receives is based on a formula that takes into account the size of the country’s economy and 
its contribution to the global economy. However, the formula results in some bias towards 
European states—for example Belgium has a larger quota than Brazil. The formula has recently 
been revised to be more favourable to some emerging markets and developing countries.   
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 Bank for International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm. Retrieved on June 23, 2009.  
30
 Additional information on the IMF can be found generally at its website. The website has a number of useful 
factsheets that briefly describe aspects of the IMF’s structure and function. A list can be found at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/eng/list.aspx.   
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A member state’s quota is relevant to three aspects of membership in the IMF. First, voting in 
the IMF is based on the quotas. This means that that the IMF has a system of weighed votes. 
According to this system, each member state receives 250 votes, known as the basic vote, plus 1 
vote for each 100,000SDR of its quota. This system, results, for example, in the United States, 
which has the largest quota, having 371,743 votes (about 17% of the total), Belgium having 
46,302 votes (about 2% of the total), Brazil having 30,611 votes (about 1.4% of the total), 
Nigeria having 17,782 votes (about 0.8% of the total) and Palau, which has the smallest quota, 
having 281 votes (0.01 percent).  
 
It should be noted that over time the share of the basic votes in the total votes has declined from 
about 11% to about 2%. Recently, the IMF membership agreed to increase the share of basic 
votes in the total vote and to make some adjustments in the total votes of some emerging market 
member states. These measures have yet to be fully implemented.   
 
The voting system has an impact on the governance of the IMF, which is discussed in more 
detail below in the section on the functions of the IMF.  
 
Quotas also affect IMF financing. Each member state is expected to make a contribution (known 
as a subscription) to the resources of the IMF, based on its quota. This contribution consists of 
25% in SDR’s or hard currency and 75% in the member state’s local currency.  
 
Finally, quotas influence member states access to IMF financing.  Each IMF financing facility 
offers members financing based on their quotas. For example, a facility might offer members 
access to financing equal to 100% of their quotas. Since the IMF has a number of facilities, 
members can gain access to financing worth significantly more than its quota.  
 
ii.  Function 
 
The IMF offers its member states regulatory, financial and technical support services. Its 
regulatory functions include conducting annual surveillance of all its member states to ensure 
that they are following policies that are consistent with their membership obligations. These 
obligations include following policies that will allow it to have a sustainable balance of payments 
position. These surveillance exercises are expected to help the IMF oversee a stable system of 
exchange rates for the international community. The reports from these country surveillance 
missions, known formally as Article IV consultations after the Article in the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement that require these missions, are only intended to be advisory. Thus, in themselves 
they do not impose any obligations on the member state. The reports are discussed by the IMF 
Board and are utilized by the IMF in preparing its World Economic Outlook Report and its other 
periodic reports to the international community on the state of the global monetary and financial 
system. 
 
The IMF also offers its member states, which are experiencing balance of payments problems, 
financial support. It has a number of different financing facilities that it utilizes in offering this 
support. Each facility is designed to deal with a different sort of balance of payments problem. 
Each member state has access to these facilities up to a stipulated percentage of its quota. The 
financing obtained through these facilities is subject to certain conditions that are designed to 
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ensure that the IMF gets its funds back and that the member state corrects its balance of 
payments problem. The conditions that the IMF attaches to its financing are often influenced by 
the advice the IMF has offered in its Article IV report on the country concerned.  
 
Over time, both the regulatory and financing functions of the IMF have expanded beyond their 
original relatively narrow monetary focus. Today, the IMF assists member states in assessing and 
enhancing their regulation of their domestic financial systems. It is also playing a role in 
collecting information on international capital markets, and, following the most recent G20 
summit, is expected to work with the Financial Stability Board to coordinate oversight of 
international capital markets—even though it has no explicit mandate to deal with international 
capital flows.  
 
Its financing functions have expanded in the sense that it now can provide financing to 
qualifying member states in a broader range of circumstances.
31
 For example, although originally 
the IMF only offered financial support to countries actually experiencing balance of payments 
problems, today it provides precautionary financial support through its Flexible Credit Line to 
qualifying countries. The support is offered to member states that are following and 
implementing what the IMF considers sound policies and are not actually experiencing balance 
of payments problems but may expect to experience them in the future due to factors beyond 
their control. In this new facility, the IMF pre-commits to making the funding available without 
conditions should the country later request it. It has also established facilities, such as the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and the Exogenous Shocks Facility, to provide 
concessional financing to low income member states. These programs are aimed at poverty 
reduction and growth rather as well as at macro-economic stability.  
 
The third function of the IMF is technical assistance. The IMF offers its poorer member 
countries a broad range of technical advisory services, all of which are designed to help the 
country improve its capacity to manage its international monetary and financial affairs in a way 
that is consistent with both its IMF obligations and its role as a participant in an international 
monetary and financial system. Thus the IMF offers member states training programs on various 
aspects of monetary, fiscal and financial affairs, advice on drafting legislation and regulations on 
these matters, and on creating effective financial and fiscal regulatory authorities.  
 
iii.  Governance 
 
The governance structure of the IMF is designed to promote accountability of the organization to 
the governments of its member states. The highest governance body is the Board of Governors. 
Each member state is entitled to appoint one Governor and usually appoints either its Minister of 
Finance or the Governor of its Central Bank to this position. The Board of Governors meets 
twice a year at the IMF’s Annual Meeting and at its Spring meeting. It has delegated almost all 
its delegable powers to the 24 member Board of Executive Directors. However, there are certain 
decisions which are reserved for the Board of Governors, such as decisions on admitting new 
members to the IMF, making quota adjustments, issuing Special Drawing Rights and amending 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Most decisions in the IMF can be made by simple majorities. 
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However, certain decisions, such as adjustments in quotas require an 85% majority. This means 
that on these types of decisions, the United States has an effective veto.  
 
The 24-member Board of Executive Directors, which is chaired by the Managing Director of the 
Fund, oversees the work of the IMF.  It is made up of: 
 5 members appointed by the 5 member states with the biggest quotas: France, Germany, 
Japan, United Kingdom and the United States,  
 3 members, called representatives of ―single member‖ constituencies, that represent 
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia; and 
 16 members elected by constituencies of the remaining 178 member states. The size of 
these constituencies range from 7-23 members per constituency. The Executive Director 
representing a particular constituency has a vote equal to the total votes of all the 
members of the constituency and he/she must cast all the votes in a block. The votes of 
the constituencies vary from 113, 969 votes (5.14% of the total) for the 10 primarily 
European member  states currently represented by Belgium to 29,855 votes (1.35% of 
the total vote) for the 23 Sub-Saharan African member states currently represented by 
Rwanda.  
 
The Executive Directors are based full-time at the IMF headquarters in Washington DC. They 
each have an Alternate Executive Director and a small staff of advisors and support staff. They 
function as both officials of the IMF and representatives of their constituencies. The Board is 
responsible for overseeing the operations of the IMF. Thus its responsibilities include approving 
all IMF financing operations, reviewing all IMF country and thematic reports, and all IMF 
policies and internal organizational matters. Normally, the IMF Board operates by consensus but, 
if necessary, it will make decisions by majority vote.  
 
The functioning of the Boards of Governors and of Executive Directors are complimented by 2 
committees of Governors. The first is the International Monetary and Finance Committee 
(IMFC). This Committee has 24 members and is constituted in a similar manner to the Board of 
Executive Directors. The IMFC meets twice per year to review the work of the IMF and the 
functioning of the global monetary and financial system. While it seeks to ensure that the IMF is 
operating in the most effective way, it only has advisory powers. Consequently, its opinions will 
only become policy and be implemented if either the Board of Governors or the Board of 
Executive Directors adopts its advice. Given that the members of the IMFC are Governors of the 
IMF and are able to instruct the Executive Directors from their countries to follow their advice, 
the IMFC is a powerful influence in the IMF.  
 
It should be noted that the IMF’s Articles of Agreement provide for the establishment of a 
―Council‖. This Council, which would have a similar structure and function to the IMFC, would 
have decision making authority. To date the Council has not been established and the IMFC is 
only expected to continue functioning until the Council is established. The creation of the 
Council is one of the reforms currently being considered for the IMF.   
 
The second committee is the Development Committee, which is a joint committee of the IMF 
and the World Bank. It also has 24 members who tend to be the Governors of the World Bank 
from the countries represented on its Board of Executive Directors. The purpose of this 
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committee is to review the economic situation for developing countries and to offer advice to the 
IMF and World Bank on ways that they can help promote larger and more predictable financial 
support to developing countries. 
 
The work of the IMF is done by its Management and staff, whose chief is the IMF Managing 
Director. In a formal sense, the staff and management are accountable to the Board. This means 
that the Board, in addition to its responsibilities in regard to the finances, human resources and 
operational policies of the IMF, must also oversee all the work of the Management and staff. 
This work includes the IMF’s financing operations in its member countries, its surveillance 
activities, its research activities and its technical support services. Given the diversity, scale and 
complexity of these operations and the relatively limited resources available to each Executive 
Director, it is unclear how effectively the Board can fulfil its oversight responsibilities. This is 
particularly true for those Board members who represent constituencies which contain numerous 
countries that utilize IMF financing and technical support services.  
 
A final point to note about the governance arrangements of the IMF is that the World Bank and 
the regional development banks all have similar governance arrangements. Thus, they all have 
weighted voting; Boards of Governors on which each member state has one representative, and 
Boards of Executive Directors composed of directors who either represent one country or 
constituencies of countries. 
 
 
B. Entities Involved in Coordinating Regulation of Financial Institutions 
 
This group consists of entities in which national regulators of financial institutions meet to 
discuss matters of common interest and to seek ways to address the international dimensions of 
financial regulatory matters. It includes the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS), and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
 
These entities share certain common characteristics. First, their membership consists of national 
or sub-national regulatory authorities and not states. For example, the membership of the BCBS 
consists of the banking regulatory authorities in 27 states. The membership of the FSB, which is 
discussed in more detail below, includes the financial sector regulators from the G20 countries 
and representatives from key international organizations like the IMF, the World Bank and the 
OECD. The IAIS has a large membership consisting of insurance industry regulators from 190 
jurisdictions, including 50 sub-national state jurisdictions in the US
32
. In addition, there are a 
number of international organizations and private insurance companies that have observer status 
in the IAIS. Finally, IOSCO has 110 securities regulators as full members and another 11 as 
associate members.  
 
There are two exceptions to this general characteristic. The first is the FATF which is composed 
of representatives from the Finance Ministries of the 33 member states. The FATF has developed 
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rules on monitoring and reporting on money laundering activities. The second is the IASB, It is a 
private body, owned and managed by a trust, which develops international accounting standards 
that it hopes regulatory authorities around the world will adopt and enforce.  
 
It is important to note that ―effective‖ membership in these bodies is not necessarily universal.  
This means either that membership is not open to all interested regulatory authorities or that, 
even if membership is open to any interested and qualifying regulatory authority, not all 
members participate equally in the affairs of the body. Examples of entities with restricted 
membership are the BCBS and the FSB. In the case of the BCBS, membership is currently 
restricted to the banking regulators from 27countries
33
. Participation in the FSB, which is 
discussed in more detail below, is limited to the financial regulatory authorities of the G20 
countries plus key international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. An example of 
an entity with general membership but limited participation is IOSCO. While it has over 100 
members and associate members and all securities regulators are eligible to join, the key work of 
IOSCO is done by its Technical Committee. While there is some effort at ensuring that all 
regions are represented on this Committee, historically most of its members come from the 
regulatory authorities in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.   
 
The second shared characteristic is that the type of work undertaken by each of these entities is 
similar. They all are forums in which regulators meet to discuss matters of common interest and 
in which they can develop codes and standards that establish ―best practices‖ in their particular 
sphere of interest. Since these entities do not produce binding standards and codes, each 
regulatory authority can then decide how it wants to utilize these codes and standards in its own 
work. For example, the BCBS has developed rules on capital adequacy and banking supervision 
that its members can, and in fact are encouraged, to implement through their national regulatory 
process.  Similarly IAIS and IOSCO have developed core principles dealing with the regulation 
of insurance companies and securities firms. In the case of IOSCO, it has also developed 
guidelines and principles applicable to regulating specific aspects of the securities industries.  
 
In the case of the IASB, it produces International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Its hope 
is that accounting bodies around the world will adopt these IFRSs and mandate that they be 
utilized by all companies in its jurisdiction. This has proven to be controversial because the 
IASB has adopted rules and standards that many believe are less demanding than the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) currently used in the United States. The result has been 
that the US has been reluctant to adopt the IASB’s rules. There are efforts underway to resolve 
this difference and have the standards developed by the IASB become the uniform standards 
across the world.  
 
The codes and standards developed by these entities are non-binding. Thus, their members, while 
encouraged to do so, are not obliged to enact the codes and standards into their domestic 
regulatory regimes. In addition, they are free to interpret these codes and standards as they see 
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fit. It is important to note, however, that developing countries and emerging market economies 
may effectively be required to adopt and implement these codes and practices. This can happen 
either because regulatory bodies in these countries see compliance with these codes and 
standards as being an indicator of their credibility as regulators or because doing so becomes a 
condition of their gaining access to international financing from sources like the IMF or the 
World Bank.  
 
Another important characteristic of these bodies is that their work has implications for national 
governance. The reason is that the way these bodies operate is that national regulators meet, 
conduct studies, develop general standards and then go back to their own countries where they 
are expected to implement these internationally agreed standards, more or less as drafted. This 
means that there can be limited opportunity for participation by other national stakeholders in the 
development of the regulations. Consequently, the existence of these international regulatory 
networks has implications for national sovereignty and the amount of independent policy space 
available to each country. However, in evaluating this issue, it is important to keep in mind that 
the need for and the growing importance of these international regulatory networks arises from 
the growing need to be able to supervise and anaged the consequences of having  globally 
integrated financial markets and institutions.   
 
The most significant of these entities in terms of global financial governance is the Financial 
Stability Board, which is discussed in more detail below.  
 
Financial Stability Board (FSB)
34




In 1999, the G7 countries established the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) as a forum in which 
senior representative of their national financial regulatory authorities could meet with senior 
representatives of  international financial institutions, standard setting bodies and committees of 
central banking experts. The membership of the FSF consisted of: 
 3 representatives from the financial industry regulators in Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States; 
 The following international organizations: the BIS, the European Central Bank35, the 
European Union
36
, the IMF, the OECD
37
, and the World Bank; and  
 The following standard setting bodies: the BCBS, the Committee on the Global Financial 
System
38
; the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
39
, the IAIS, the IASB and 
IOSCO. 
The FSF was converted into the FSB following the G20 Summit in London in June 2009. Thus, 
the membership of the FSB now includes representatives from each of the G20 countries in 
addition to the international organizations and standard setting bodies indicated above. However, 
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while the 7 original members each have 3 representatives on the FSB, the new members have 1, 
2 or 3 representatives. The following countries have 1 representative: Argentina, Hong Kong 
SAR, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Singapore and Turkey; the following have 2 
representatives: Australia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Korea, Spain, and Switzerland; and the 




The primary purpose of the FSB is to contribute to international financial stability by promoting 
effective regulatory and supervisory policies and practices. While its primary focus is on stability 
in its member states, it is also expected to play a key role in promoting global financial stability. 
In addition to undertaking its own research and its work with its member states, the FSB also 
works with its international organization and standard setting body members on the development 
and promotion of consistent regulatory and supervisory standards around the world.  
Consequently, the FSB anticipates that non-member states and their financial regulatory 
authorities will pay careful attention to its work. In many cases, these non-member states will be 
informed of the FSB’s work through their interactions with the international organizations and 
standard setting bodies that are members of the FSB.  In fact, it is likely that at least some of the 
international organizations that are members of the FSB will encourage their member states to 
adopt the regulatory and supervisory standards and policies established by the FSB.   
 
Examples of the types of studies that the FSB is likely to undertake, based on the work of the 
FSF, are: the Financial Stability Forum’s Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis 
Management
40
, the Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Procyclicality in the 
Financial System
41







The governance of the FSB consists of a plenary meeting, a Steering Committee and three 
Standing Committees. The plenary meetings, which can be attended by the representatives from 
all member states sets the general direction of the FSB. The FSB holds 2 plenary sessions per 
year and as many other telephonic meetings as are deemed necessary. Given that the FSB was 
only established in 2009, it is not yet clear exactly how often these telephonic meetings will 
occur.  
 
The Steering Committee, which is chaired by the chairperson of the FSB, provides operational 
guidance to the FSB between plenary sessions. The chair of the Steering Committee, who is 
currently the Governor of Banco d‖Italia,  is appointed in his/her personal capacity.  
 
The three standing committees are the Standing Committees for Vulnerabilities Assessment; 
Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation; and Standards Implementation. The Standing 
Committee for Vulnerabilities Assessment, which is currently, chaired by the General Manager 
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of the BIS, is responsible for assessing and monitoring vulnerabilities in the financial system and 
for proposing actions that can help address these vulnerabilities. Thus, its work provides the 
basis for the FSB’s Early Warning Exercises, which are intended to warn the FSB and its 
members of systemic problems that may be arising in the financial system or in systemically 
significant financial institutions. The Standing Committee for Supervisory and Regulatory 
Cooperation, which is currently chaired by the head of the UK Financial Service Authority, is 
responsible for liaising with the national supervisory and regulatory authorities of the FSB 
members on any supervisory or regulatory issues that may arise and that are of interest to the 
members. This means that this committee is responsible for advising FSB members on best 
practices in financial regulation, on promoting consistency and cooperation and fair competition 
across jurisdictions, and for advising on cross-border crisis management both at major financial 
institutions and more generally.  
 
One innovation of the FSB is that the members are obliged to undergo peer reviews, which will 
be conducted by the Standing Committee for Standards Implementation. This Committee, which 
is currently chaired by the Associate Deputy Minister of the Department of Finance of Canada, 
will undertake the peer reviews and report to the FSB on how members are implementing 
international financial standards and other initiatives. Thus, the function of this Committee is to 
promote adherence to prudential regulatory and supervisory standards by FSB member states.  
 
It is important to note that, since the membership of the FSB includes the regulatory authorities 
in all the major financial centres and the major emerging markets, its work, de facto, will set the 
global standards in financial regulation. In fact, it is envisaged by the G20 that the FSB and the 
IMF will become the key institutions in coordinating international financial governance.
43
 Given 
its expected role in global financial governance and to compensate for its restricted membership, 
the FSB will hold regular regional meetings at which non-member financial authorities will be 
consulted about matters of common interest.   
 
C. Mechanisms for Coordination Between Countries 
 
The third category of global governance mechanisms is the relatively small groupings of 
countries with similar interests which seek to play an active role in international financial 
governance. These groupings can be divided into two sub-categories. First are those groups, like 
the G8
44
 and the G20
45
, that seek to play a role a management role in global financial 
governance. Second are groups, like the G10 and the G24, that seek to influence the policy and 
work of specific international organizations, like the IMF.  
 
Country Groupings Playing a Role in Global Financial Governance 
 
The oldest of these groups is the G8. It was created in 1975 as the G6 becoming the G7 in 1976, 
when Canada joined the group, and finally the G8 in 1998, when Russia formally joined. The 
members of the group are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
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and the United States. It originally was intended to be an informal gathering of the leaders from 
the world’s largest economies to discuss economic matters of mutual concern and to coordinate 
their responses to these matters. The leaders would meet annually, with the location rotating 
amongst the members, and the host acting as the chair. Beginning in 1989, the G8 (then only the 
G7) began to invite the leaders from a small group of countries to participate in part of their 
meeting. This practice eventually resulted in a group known as the ―Outreach 5‖ (Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico and South Africa) being regularly invited to attend at least part of the G8 meeting. 
In recent years the host of the G8 summit has often invited additional leaders thought to be 
playing a significant role in their own region to attend the meetings. Over time these meetings 
have become better known for their spectacle than their substance. Although the preparatory 
meetings to these G8 summits and the regular meetings that take place between senior finance 
and economic officials from the G8 still do play a significant role in coordinating financial 
policy and approaches to international financial governance issues among these countries.  
 
From the time of its formation until the new millennium, the G8 functioned almost as the 
executive committee for global financial governance. Its views on monetary and financial policy 
often were adopted and implemented by other key international financial organizations, such as 
the IMF and the World Bank. However, over this time period, the balance of economic power in 
the world began to shift. As a result the ability of the G8 countries to contribute to effective 
global economic governance has diminished.  
 
This first became obvious during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. In the wake of this crisis, 
the United States government invited a group of 22 countries to meet to discuss responses to the 
crisis. This eventually led to the creation of the G20.. 
 
The members of the G20 are, in addition to the G8 countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil China, 
the European Union, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and 
Turkey. They were selected because of their global or regional economic importance and to 
ensure a reasonably balanced regional representation in the group. The G20 membership 
coincides more or less with the 20 largest economies in the world, adjusted to ensure that all 
regions are represented in the group. In total the G20 represent about 80% of the world’s 
population and economy. Thus, it does have the power to exercise strong influence over the 
global financial and economic system.  
 
The first meetings of the G20 were meetings of Ministers of Finance who met to discuss matters 
of mutual concern relating to international financial governance. Since the G20 is a larger 
grouping than the G8, it has evolved a more formal operating structure than the G8. Currently, 
there are two connected aspects of the G20. The first is the series of regular meetings of financial 
officials from the G20 countries and the annual meeting of the Ministers of Finance from these 
countries. The chair of these meetings rotates among the member countries and the chair’s 
country hosts the meetings. The second is the G20 Summit, the first of which was held in 
Washington in late 2008. At these summits the heads of government of the G20 countries meet 
to discuss matters of concern and to try and give guidance to global financial governance. These 
summits have also established working groups, co-chaired by a developing country and a rich 
country, to lead G20 efforts in regard to key issues in global financial governance. These 
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working groups focus on reform of the IMF, reform of the World Bank, and financial regulatory 
matters.  
 
Currently, we are in a period of transition, during which the G20 appears to be supplanting the 
G8’s role in global financial governance. However, it is important to note that this transition is 
not without its critics. These critics fall into two basic groups. The first group questions the 
composition of the G20. Critics in this camp argue that the size of the grouping is arbitrary. 
Some of these critics think it should be bigger in order to ensure that all economically significant 
countries can participate. Others argue that it should be smaller to enhance its efficiency. The 
second group of critics challenge the legitimacy of the G20. They argue that the only legitimate 
group is the G192 that is a grouping in which all countries, or at least all UN member states, can 
participate. Some members in this group argue for indirect representation, with the members of 
the G20 (or some similar grouping) being chosen, perhaps on a rotating basis, as representatives 
of particular regions or interest groupings.   
 
Interest Groups in International Financial Governance 
 
The second category of informal groupings consists of those groups that seek to enhance their 
position or promote their views in the institutions of international financial governance. The best 
known of them operate in relation to the IMF.  
 
The oldest of the groups is the G10. It was formed by those countries that entered into the 
General Agreement to Borrow (GAB) with the IMF in 1962.  Initially, the purpose of the GAB 
was to give the IMF access to additional financing in case the countries participating in the GAB 
needed to utilize IMF financing.  The participating countries were concerned that if too many of 
them needed IMF financing, it would take up too much of the IMF’s general resources and cause 
problems for the other member states. However, over time it became clear that these countries 
were not likely to draw on the financing services of the IMF and the GAB was amended to allow 
the IMF to draw on it whenever it needed additional financial resources, provided it did so in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the GAB.  In addition, over time the number of 
countries participating in the GAB increased to 11.  
 
Following the establishment of the GAB, the participating countries, used to meet periodically to 
discuss issues of mutual interest in regard to the IMF. This grouping, known as the G10, thus 
became an informal mechanism through which rich countries could coordinate and advance their 
views within the IMF.  The countries participating in the G10, which actually has 11 members 
are  Belgium; Canada; Germany; France; Italy; Japan; Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom; and the United States, some of which countries participate through their central banks. 
 
A number of developing countries decided that the developing countries needed their own 
grouping in the IMF to counteract the weight of the G10. Consequently, they formed the G24, 
which, in principle, has 24 participating states, of which 8 represent Africa, 8 represent Asia and 
8 represent Latin America. The countries participating in the group do change over time but the 





 Africa:  Algeria; Cote d'Ivoire; Egypt; Ethiopia; Gabon; Ghana; Nigeria; and 
South Africa. 
 Asia:  India; Islamic Republic of Iran; Lebanon; Pakistan; Philippines; Sri Lanka; 
Syrian Arab Republic.  
 Latin America: Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; Guatemala; Mexico; Peru; Trinidad and 
Tobago; and Venezuela. 
 
The G24 has a secretariat in Washington that commissions research; helps arrange meetings of 
the member states and facilitates communication and coordination of positions among the 
participating states.  
 
It should be noted that the EU member states also seek to coordinate their positions in regard to 
the work and policies of the IMF. Thus, in addition to the mechanisms for policy coordination 
that exist in Brussels and under the applicable EU treaties, the Executive Directors at the IMF 
from EU member states meet regularly to exchange views and, when applicable, to coordinate 
their positions on issues that will be coming before the Board.  
 
These informal groupings do not only exist in relation to the IMF. An example of a group that 
seeks to advance its interests in relation to other mechanisms of international governance is the 
10 member Committee of African Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors that works 
with South Africa to advance African interests in the G20.
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 The participants in this Committee 
are the Finance Ministers from South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Cameroon and Tanzania and the 
Central Bank Governors from Botswana, Kenya, Algeria, the West African States and the 
Central African States. Representatives from the African Development Bank, the African Union 
Commission, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa also participate in this 
Committee. This Committee was created in 2009 in connection with the April 2009 G20 Summit 
in London.  
 
These informal groupings of countries share certain common characteristics. First, they are all 
informal. This means that there is no binding agreement upon which their existence is based and 
from which they derive their mandate. They are merely groups of countries that have similar 
concerns and interests and thus choose to meet in order to more effectively advocate for their 
interests and concerns in the relevant institutions to which they relate. It follows that the 
membership in these groupings is not fixed and can change as circumstances change. 
 
Second, these groupings do not have any formal standing in the organizations to which they 
relate. This means that the organization is under no obligation to interact with these groupings, 
let alone to actually follow their recommendations or advice. This is true even in the case of the 
G10, although the IMF will negotiate with these countries over issues related to the renewal and 
implementation of the GAB. This is not to suggest that informally the relevant institution might 
not follow the work of the grouping and take advantage of its existence for particular purposes. 
One example of this is the G24 which benefits from IMF support. 
 





Third, the fact that some of these informal groupings have been in existence for some time 
suggests that they must serve a useful function for the participants in the groupings. This 
suggests that it might be useful for other groupings of like-minded states to consider forming 
such informal groups in regard to other key institutions in international financial governance, 
such as the FSB.  
 
IV. Regional Financial Governance 
 
The institutional arrangements for global financial governance are complimented by regional 
financial governance arrangements. The most developed of these exist in the European Union but 
there are regional efforts at dealing with financial and monetary affairs in all parts of the world.  
 
The European Union (EU) includes countries that have the Euro as their currency and countries 
that continue to use their own currencies. The participants in the Euro-zone are members of the 
European Central Bank, which is the most advanced effort at regional monetary governance. In 
effect, these countries have surrendered their monetary sovereignty to a supra-national body. The 
EU member states have also developed mechanisms for coordinating monetary and financial 
policy. These operate primarily through the EU institutions, which include the EU Council, EU 
Commission and the EU Parliament. For example, the economic ministers of the member 
countries meet as the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin)
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, under the chair of the 
country that presides over the EU Council. Through these mechanisms the EU member states 
also make efforts to coordinate their positions in the global financial governance institutions.  
 
Asia has begun to develop efforts at regional monetary coordination, primarily through the 
Chiang Mai Initiative
48
, which is a project of the ASEAN plus 3 grouping. This initiative seeks 
to establish arrangements between Asian Central Banks to assist each other in the event that they 
are facing foreign exchange rate or payments crises. The initiative will have the effect of 
protecting the participating states from having to go to the IMF for support. In addition, these 
countries are now seeking to establish an Asian bond market to promote capital raising in the 
region. Both these initiatives could over time lead to more coordinated regional financial 
governance arrangements.  
 
Efforts at regional coordination exist in Africa, the Caribbean, Gulf States, and Latin America.  
For example, the Caribbean states have their own committees of financial regulators to 
coordinate financial regulation in the region
49
 and there is a Caribbean Financial Action Task 
Force.
50
 The Gulf States have established an Arab Monetary Fund.
51
 On paper, Africa has plans 
to create an African Central Bank and an African currency. However, these plans are not yet 
being implemented. Latin America
52
 also has sub-regional monetary and financial regulatory 
groupings.  






 For information on Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors see: : http://www.cgbsnet.org/, and on Caribbean 






 For information on the Center for Latin Americann  Monetary Studies (CEMLA) see: : 




This brief description of regional financial governance arrangements, albeit not comprehensive, 
serves to indicate that all regions of the world are making efforts to better coordinate their 
monetary and financial policies and governance arrangements. This makes sense because in all 
cases there are greater similarities and areas of common interest at the regional level than exist at 
the global level. One issue that the existence of these regional arrangements raises is whether or 
not they have the potential to either become either an alternative to global governance 
arrangements or a compliment them. This is an issue to which we will return in the last module.  
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this module has been to provide an overview of the institutional arrangements for 
international financial governance. It has shown that there are a large number of institutions and 
mechanisms involved in international financial governance. These institutions and mechanisms 
can be classified into 3 categories. The first consists of international organizations, like the IMF, 
the World Bank and the BIS. These institutions have their own mandates related to international 
financial governance. In most cases, these mandates, which relate to both the regulation of the 
international monetary and financial system and to the provision of financing to qualifying 
member states, are dynamic and have tended to grow to meet the evolving needs of their member 
states. 
 
The second category consists of coordinating networks of financial regulators. These networks 
are convoked by entities that may have more or less formal legal existences. Their purpose is to 
provide forums for discussion of regulatory matters of common interest, to promote coordinated 
national regulation of financial entities and markets and to help develop standards and codes of 
best practices in financial supervision and regulation.  
 
The third category are informal groupings of states that come together to advance the interests of 
their participants in regard to aspects of financial governance. These groupings can be divided 
into 2 groups. The first is those groupings, such as the G8 and the G20, that play an active role in 
international financial governance. The second are those groupings of like-minded states that 
seek to enhance their influence in key international financial governance institutions.  
 
The module also indicated that there is a fourth category of governance arrangements that has 
some capacity to influence the dynamics of global financial governance. These are regional 
governance arrangements. Currently, except for the EU, these arrangements do not currently play 
a significant role in global financial affairs. However, there is potential for their role to grow in 
the future as the institutional arrangements for global financial governance evolve. 
 
It should be clear from this module that the institutional arrangements for international financial 
governance are complex. They involve many institutions and mechanisms that often have 
overlapping areas of interest and responsibility and which allow for differing degrees of 
participation by interested states. There are 2 consequences that follow from the current 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/cosra/inter.asp; on Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) see: www.flar.net on 




situation. The first is that there is a certain degree of incoherence in international financial 
governance, in the sense that the system may not able to effectively deal with issues as they arise 
because it is not always clear which entity has primary responsibility for dealing with the issue 
and there is not always an obvious way for resolving tensions between institutions within the 
international financial governance system. The G20 is attempting to address this incoherence 
issue by giving the IMF and the FSB coordinating responsibilities in the system. Second, there is 
a certain ―legitimacy deficit‖ in the system because not all states and all stakeholders are 
adequately represented in the system.  
 
We will return to these consequences and other deficiencies in international financial governance 
in the final module, when we look at efforts to reform international financial governance.  
 
 
Module 3: The Functions of International Financial Governance  





The focus of this module is on the functions that the institutions, entities and groupings discussed 
in module 2 must perform if they are to deliver effective international financial governance. It 
seeks to provide the readers with an understanding of both the nature of these functions and how 
they are executed in the current arrangements for international financial governance.   
 
In order to achieve this objective, the module is divided into three sections. The first section is a 
brief discussion of the five functions that must be performed for there to be effective financial 
governance. The second section is devoted to a discussion of how these functions are performed 
by the institutions, entities and groupings involved in international financial governance (IEGs). 
The final section is a conclusion.  
 
It is important to note that, given the complexity of the subject and the relatively large number of 
entities involved in global financial governance, it is not possible for this module to be a 
comprehensive discussion of the specific governance functions performed by each of the IEGs. 
Readers who are interested in such a discussion should refer to the sources and websites cited in 
the bibliography at the end of the module.   
 
VII. The Five Functions That Must Be Performed For Effective International Financial 
Governance 
 
This section focuses on the five functions required for effective international financial 
governance. Its purpose is to describe the functions and explain why they are so important to any 
international financial governance system.  These five functions can be divided into two groups. 
First, there are those functions that must be performed by any system of financial governance. 
They are information and analysis, regulation, and financial assistance. Second, there are those 
functions which, while they may or may not be part of any system of financial governance, are 
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essential elements of effective international financial governance. They are technical support and 
coordination.   
 
A. Functions That Are Essential to Financial Governance 
 
Information and Analysis 
 
Effective governance depends on the responsible institutions and individuals being 
knowledgeable about and having a good understanding of the workings of the system for which 
they are responsible. This necessitates them having access, in a timely manner, to both the raw 
data on the functioning of the system and adequate analysis of the data for them to understand its 
significance.  This information and analysis should be the basis for their decisions relating to the 
management and operation of the financial system for which they are responsible. It is important 
to recognize that the information and analysis required by the responsible parties should include 
both quantitative and qualitative elements. 
 
The officials responsible for financial governance need access to at least two types of 
information. First, they should receive the basic data that allows them to understand the scale of 
the operations of the financial system. Thus, they will need information on the size of financial 
flows, the form in which these flows take place, the terms on which the flows occur, the size and 
scale of operations of the key financial institutions in the system, and on the purposes for which 
the financial flows are used. They will also need information on the risks being created by these 
activities and on the measures being taken to mitigate these risks. In the case of an international 
system, the responsible parties will also need information on the balance of payments and 
external debt position of all the participating member states, on the external funding needs of 
member states and their ability to meet these needs, on the cross border transactions undertaken 
by financial institutions, and on trading in the foreign exchange markets.   
 
Second, they will need information on the functioning of the regulatory framework or 
frameworks applicable to all actors in the system. Thus they will need information on how well 
the rules are being followed by the various actors in the system, on instances of non-compliance 
with the rules, on new developments in finance that could impact on the efficacy of the rules, 
and, if there is more than one applicable regulatory scheme, on how the different regulatory 
schemes are interacting with each other.  This information is critical to the continued 
effectiveness of financial governance because over time all regulation is likely to diminish in 
effectiveness as the actors in the system learn how to conduct their operations in ways that 
minimize the impact of those parts of the rules that they do not like and as innovations in finance 
occur that are not fully covered by the rules.  
 
For effective financial governance, it is not sufficient that only the key decision makers receive 
the above information. All the stakeholders in the international financial system need access to 
enough of this information that they can make considered decisions in their own operations and 
can take the necessary actions to mitigate risk and exploit all potentially beneficial financing 
opportunities. The various stakeholders in the financial system include regulators, financial 
institutions, public policy makers, creditors and debtors, savers and investors, and civil society. 
They will use this information in making credit allocation and investment decisions, developing 
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monetary and fiscal policy, designing effective regulatory frameworks, and in formulating 
appropriate poverty alleviation and development policies. In addition, they can use this 
information to adjust the regulatory frameworks so that they incentivize the type of transactions 
that support appropriate public policy.  
 
It is important to recognize that international financial governance is concerned with the 
operation of financial systems at both the national and the international level. At a national level 
it is concerned with both those aspects of national financial systems that affect the macro-
economic and monetary performance of each state and those aspects that impact the cross-border 
activities of national financial institutions. At the international level, it is concerned with both the 
scale and regulation of financial markets that operate globally, for example the Euromarkets. 
This suggests that the responsible parties in international financial governance need information 
on the operations and regulation of both national and global financial markets. They will also 
need information on areas of potential conflict and harmony between these different financial 
systems and regulatory frameworks, and on the challenges that they create for the various actors 




In order for any governance system to function effectively, it must provide clear guidance to all 
actors in the system on the rules that they should follow in their decisions and actions. This 
means that a key aspect of governance is regulation. The governance arrangements must include 
a regulatory framework that offers all actors clear guidance on what is permissible conduct and 
what is not, that creates incentives for the various actors to behave in a way that ensures a stable 
financial system that encourages appropriate innovation and risk mitigation measures, that 
ensures that all actors maintain the necessary records, that encourages all stakeholders in the 
financial system to make  informed decisions about the transactions that they undertake, that 
promotes efficient financial markets that offer fair access to all and allocates credit in a manner 
that is socially and environmentally responsible, and that establishes clear procedures and 
standards for handling problems arising from the operation of the financial system.  These 
problems include instances of non-compliance with the regulations, disputes about particular 
transactions and about the content of applicable regulation, the failure of individual financial 
institutions, and systemic breakdowns. 
 
Financial and Monetary Assistance 
 
It should be recognized that a complex system like a financial system will never function 
perfectly.  Consequently, it is probable that every financial system will experience challenges 
and occasional crises. These challenges and crises can be caused by weak financial regulation 
and institutions, by the poor judgement and conduct of individual actors, or by factors beyond 
either individual or institutional control. However, in all these cases, there can be severe adverse 
impacts on both the parties directly involved in the particular situation and on all the other 
participants in the financial system. In order to mitigate these adverse impacts, it may be 
necessary for the responsible authorities to provide financial support to the adversely affected 
parties or to the financial system as a whole. Thus, the capacity to provide financial support 




In the case of the international financial system financial assistance may also be required to 
support a stable international monetary system.  Without such support, states may find it difficult 
to correct serious balance of payments problems and thus to contribute to a stable system of 
exchange rates. Consequently, international financial governance requires a mechanism for 
providing financial assistance to support appropriate responses to macro-economic and monetary 
problems or crises in the states participating in the international financial system.   
 




Any international financial system inevitably creates technical challenges for some of its 
participants. In general, the financial systems in poor countries are smaller, less complex and 
dynamic than the financial systems in the rich countries and they also face different problems 
from those experienced in the rich countries. Nevertheless, the regulators in these countries need 
to make sure that their financial regulatory frameworks are consistent with the demands of the 
modern international financial system. If they fail to do so, they risk being excluded from 
effective participation in international financial markets, thereby harming their development 
prospects. In addition to these regulators, the officials who work in the financial institutions in 
poor countries need to understand enough about the operations of the international financial 
system that, where appropriate, they can take advantage of and can avoid being overwhelmed by 
the dynamics and pressures created by the international financial system.  
 
The existence of these two groups of actors generates two types of ―educational‖ demands on the 
institutions of international financial governance. First, they need to develop the technical 
expertise and management systems required to operate regulatory frameworks and financial 
institutions that are responsive to the dynamics and pressures of the modern international 
financial system. In order to develop this expertise they may need the institutions and entities 
involved in the governance of the international financial system to provide them with training 
programs, and advisory services, including the direct provision of technical expertise.  
 
Second, those governance institutions and actors that operate primary at the ―high‖ end of the 
financial system, meaning that they are concerned with its most complex and sophisticated 
transactions, need to be informed about conditions experienced by actors at the ―low‖ end of the 
system, meaning that they are engaged in relatively simple financial transactions and in efforts to 
enhance the provision of financial services to poor people. This is particularly important if they 
are to help develop international regulatory frameworks and ―best practice‖ guidelines that are 




The international financial system has become very complex. Its governance is divided among a 
number of IEGs.  This is partly because the international financial governance arrangements 
have been created in response to particular events and geo-political realities.
53
 However, it is also 
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a consequence of the key role that sovereign states, who are not willing to surrender all their 
sovereign powers related to money and finance to an international entity, play in the international 
system. Thus, effective international financial governance requires coordination between these 
different IEGs. 
 
Coordination is also required between the IEGs of international financial governance and those 
active in non-financial global governance. This follows from the international community 
assigning responsibility for different aspects of international governance to different specialized 
international bodies. For example, under the existing arrangements, even though international 
financial issues can profoundly impact public health or the environment, it is the World Health 
Organization or the United Nations Environmental Program, and not international financial 
governance bodies that are responsible for global governance of health or environmental issues. 
This means that the IEGs of international financial governance cannot adequately account for all 
the consequences and implications of their decisions and actions without communicating with 
these other specialized global governance institutions.   
 
It follows therefore that there is a need for two coordinating entities or mechanisms. First, there 
should be an entity or mechanism that is responsible for coordinating all the IEGs involved in 
international financial governance. This coordinating entity or mechanism must ensure that all 
the relevant IEGs act in mutually supportive ways. It must also play a role in resolving disputes 
between the different actors in the system.  
 
Second, there should be a mechanism or entity that coordinates the IEGs of international 
financial governance with those of other aspects of international governance, including the 
management of the real economy, the environment, labour and social conditions in the 
international community, and human rights. In the absence of this coordination mechanism there 
is a risk that either financial governance will dominate other aspects of international governance 
or that it will act at cross purpose to these other elements thereby undermining the efficacy of 
international governance in general or of specific aspects of international governance. Ultimately 
weakened international governance in non-financial areas will adversely affect international 
financial governance as well.  
 
VIII. Global Financial Regulatory Institutions, Entities and Groupings and Governance 
Functions. 
 
In this section we will look at how the IEGs engaged in international financial governance 
perform the various functions described above.  It should be noted that, in addition to the global 
IEGs discussed in this module, there are also regional IEGs that play a role in international 
financial governance, albeit limited to their particular regions. Readers who are interested in 
learning more about these regional bodies should refer to the references on regional bodies listed 
in Module 2. 
 
A. Information and Analysis 
 
Readers should not be surprise to learn that most IEG’s play a role in information and analysis 
since this function is the foundation on which all effective international financial governance is 
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based. In addition, sometimes the most productive mechanism for international governance in an 
international system based on sovereign states is information sharing. 
 
In evaluating the information and analysis function of the various IEGs, there are two important 
issues to consider. First, do they collect information and undertake analysis on all relevant issues. 
Second, how much of their information and analysis do they make available to the various 
stakeholders in the international financial system. These two issues will influence the particular 
IEG’s effectiveness as a mechanism for international financial governance.   
 
Despite the fact that most IEG’s perform information and analysis functions, they do so in a 
variety of different ways, as can be seen from the following discussion of the information and 




The key international organizations involved in international financial governance are the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
54
, the World Bank Group (the World Bank)
55
, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS)
56
, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
57
.  Each of these 
organizations performs an information and analysis function.  
 
The IMF through its surveillance missions
58
 to each of its member countries is able to gather 
information about their monetary, financial, and fiscal policies and about their applicable 
regulatory frameworks. It uses this information to advise the member state on its macro-
economic policies, to formulate its views on the functioning of the international financial system 
and to determine where its financial and technical support might be most needed and how it can 
be most effectively provided. The IMF publishes significant portions of the information member 
states provide to it on its website.
 
While the IMF is not the only possible source of such 
information, it should be recognized that this is one of the public goods that it offers to the 
international community. 
 
The IMF also utilizes this information to produce regular reports, such as the World Economic 
Outlook
59
 and the Global Financial Stability Report
60
, that provide the international community 
and financial sector with analysis and information on the state of the global financial system. 




 The World Bank Group consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the International 
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation; the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; 
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. For more information,  see: 
www.worldbank.org. Some members of the Group also have their own websites, see: www.ifc.org and 






 Pursuant to Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, the IMF is expected to exercise ―firm surveillance over the 
exchange rate policies‖ of its member states. It does this by regularly consulting with each of its member states 
about the economic and financial policies. The IMF’s Articles of Agreement are available on its website: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm 
59
 Text is available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/index.htm 
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These reports communicate to the international community the IMF’s views on future 
developments in the international financial system and possible responses to these developments.  
 
In addition, the IMF obtains information from the voluntary evaluations it does of its member 
states’ financial regulatory arrangements. These assessments, which result in ―Reports on 
Observance of Standards and Codes‖
61
, are based on the 12 guidelines, which were originally 
identified by the Financial Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board)
62
 as particularly 
relevant to effective financial regulation.  In these reports, the IMF evaluates the degree of 
consistency between the national regulatory arrangements and these standards and offers the 
member state advice on how to bring its regulatory arrangements into conformity with these 
standards and codes.  
 
These so-called key standards deal with the availability of financial data, assessment of fiscal 
and monetary policy, financial sector regulation, and the integrity of financial markets. The 12 
key standards are
63
:   
 
 Standards Dealing with Transparency  
 
1. Code of Good Practices on Monetary and Financial Policies64. This code was issued by 
the IMF and it promotes transparent practices in the conduct of monetary and financial 
sector policy. Its focus is on the policy making process rather than on the actual substance 
of policies. 
2. Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency65. This code was issued by the IMF, and 
deals with the role and responsibilities of governments in regard to the making and 
regulation of fiscal policy and with the transparency required for effective budgetary and 
fiscal policy.  
3. The IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard/General Data Dissemination System66: 
This system, which was developed by the IMF, specifies the data that IMF member states 
should be making available to international capital markets. The IMF offers members two 
systems:  the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and the less stringent General 
Data Dissemination Standard (GDDS).  
 
Standards Dealing with Financial Sector Regulation 
 
4. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision67.  This code was issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). It addresses such concerns as the licensing 
and structure of banks; the regulation and supervision of banks, the key informational 
needs for effective regulation and supervision, and the requisite powers for banking 
supervision.  

















5. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation68. This code was issued by the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). It deals with key issues 
related to the regulation of international capital markets, including, the responsibilities of 
issuers, secondary market activity, regulatory cooperation and the responsibilities of 
market intermediaries. 
6. Insurance Supervisory Principles69.  This code was issued by International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). It addresses such topics as supervisory arrangements for 
effective regulation of the insurance industry, key issues in the management and 
operation of insurance companies, and the supervision of transnational insurance 
companies.  
7. Principles Dealing with Payments and Settlements Systems: This consists of two sets of 
principles—one dealing with payment systems and the other with settlement systems: 
a. Core Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems70. These principles 
were issued by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the 
BIS. They are aimed at controlling access to credit, liquidity and the operation of 
stable payments and settlements systems.  
b. Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems.71 These recommendations 
were developed jointly by IOSCO and the CPSS. It deals with the procedures and 
institutional arrangements needed for effective settlement of transactions in 
capital markets.  
8. The Forty +9 Special Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force72. As its 
name suggests these recommendations were developed by the FATF. It sets out the 
obligations of  states that are interested in working with the FATF to limit money 
laundering and other illegal transactions taking place through the banking and financial 
system.  
 
Standards Dealing with Integrity of Markets 
 
9. International Fi nancial Reporting Standards (IFRS73).  These standards which are 
developed under the auspices of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
deal with issues related to the presentation of accurate and useful general purpose 
financial statements.  
10. International Standards on Auditing74. These standards were developed by the 
International Federation of Accountants. They deal with the principles and practices that 
auditors and accountants should follow in their auditing work.  










 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss46.htm.   
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11. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance75. These principles, which were developed 
under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), address topics relevant to ensuring transparent, effective and fair corporate 
governance. Consequently, they address such issues as the rights of shareholders, 
protection of stakeholders other than shareholders (such as employees, customers, 
suppliers and the community), and the responsibilities of corporate directors.   
12. Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems76. These 
principles were developed as a collaborative effort between the World Bank, the IMF and 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).  They deal 
with such issues as creditor rights, the legal framework for corporate insolvency, banking 
insolvencies, and informal corporate workouts.  
 
The World Bank and the regional development banks (collectively ―the MDBs‖) provide useful 
information about and analysis of their borrowing countries and about their operations in these 
countries. The MDBs have access to important data on these countries through their ongoing 
dialogue with these member states and through the country economic and sector research and 
analysis that they undertake in these countries. This includes the information that the World 
Bank learns from its Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP)
77
, which is often done in 
conjunction with the IMF. In addition to this information being shared with the member state 
concerned, a significant amount of it is publicly available through the World Bank and the other 
MDB’s websites and publications.  These institutions also use this information to make informed 
judgements about how to allocate their financial and capacity building resources.  
 
Another source of information for the MDBs that is relevant to financial governance is the 
information that they obtain through monitoring the execution of their development policy 
loans/credits. This information is complimented by the information garnered by the evaluation 
reports that the independent evaluation offices of each of the MDBs do on their completed and 
ongoing project and programme operations.
78
   
 
It should be recognized that much of their work is focused on development rather than financial 
management. Thus, the independent evaluation offices of each of the MDBs prepare reports and 
studies on issues relating to the various sectors in which they fund projects, on matters relevant 
to poverty alleviation, the environment, gender dimensions of development, good governance at 
the national level, as well as on international financial and economic issues. While much of their 
work is controversial, their studies and reports, contain valuable information that is relied on by 
researchers, governments, civil society groups and activists campaigning for radical changes in 
the governance of the global economy. In fact, the MDBs information and analytical work is an 
                                                                                                                                                             
The auditing practices are available at: 
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important public good that offers the international community critical data on all aspects of 
development and the global economy.  
 
The BIS collects valuable data on cross border financial flows from international banks.
79
  This 
information is published on a regular basis by the BIS.  The BIS also cooperates with the IMF 
and other international organizations on developing uniform practices for collecting data, for 
example balance of payments data, at the national level. The BIS also plays an important role in 
analysing international financial information and making it available to its members and other 
stakeholders. Some sub-committees of the BIS, for example the CPSS
80
, also collect and 
disseminate information on regulatory practices that are relevant to the banking industry and its 
regulators. Some of this information amounts to guidance to the international community on 
international best practices in a particular area.  
 
The WTO’s mandate is concentrated on international trade, including international trade in 
financial services. Pursuant to this mandate it has access to information on both the scale and 
regulation of trade and investment in the financial services sector. This information can be useful 
to regulators who are always looking for more information on the key actors in their financial 
sectors.  
 
In summary, it can be seen that collectively these international organizations provide an 
important and rich information and analysis service. In recent years, most of this information has 
become publicly available. Except for the MDBs, most of this information is focused on 
relatively narrow financial and monetary matters. While this is understandable in terms of the 
mandates of these organizations, it does raise concerns about the comprehensiveness of the 
information that they collect. In particular, it is not clear if these organizations are fully exploring 
either the impact of non-financial issues on the operation of the international financial system or 
the implications of the operation of the international financial system for non-financial aspects of 
international governance.  
 
Entities Involved in Coordinating Regulation of Financial Institutions 
 
As we saw in the second module, there are a number of entities involved in coordinating 
regulation of financial institutions. Except for the Financial Stability Board (FSB), these entities 
tend to focus on a specific sub-set of financial actors or a specific set of issues. For example, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
81
, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO)
82
 and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
83
 
coordinate national regulators dealing with commercial banks, capital markets and insurance 
companies respectively. On the other hand, entities like the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)
84
 and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
85
 deal with specific issues—
the FATF deals with transparency and money laundering in financial transactions and the IASB 












 : www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
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works to ensure consistency in international accounting standards so that financial reports across 
the world are reasonably comparable.  
 
One of the main purposes of these entities is to help enhance the functional effectiveness of all 
the national agencies that belong to them. One important way in which they do this is to keep 
their members informed about developments in their sphere of operations. Thus, for example, 
they will prepare papers and undertake studies on topics of interest to their members. In addition, 
as was shown above, these entities, together with organizations, such as the IMF, World Bank, 
and the OECD, have developed a number of the 12 standards and codes that are viewed as 
establishing the key principles and standards for effective financial governance.   
 
While these standards and codes are expected to be universally applicable, it is important to note 
that there are grounds for concern about the ability of all interested states to participate in the 
work of these entities. As we saw in the discussion of these entities in module 2, while they may 
have wide international membership, not all states or members are able to participate equally in 
the key decision making bodies within these entities. This, in turn, raises questions about how 
adequately these standards and codes address the interests and concerns of all members. 
Nevertheless, the IMF and the World Bank utilize these standards and codes in their assessments 
of the financial regulatory frameworks of their member states. Moreover, at least for those states 
that make use of the IMF and World Bank’s financial and technical support services, these 
standards can be ―imposed‖ on the member states through the conditionalities attached to their 
financing or through the advice conveyed by their technical support services.  
 
Mechanisms for Coordination  
 









, that states have created for promoting cooperation with other countries having similar 
interests. One of the key functions of these mechanisms is to provide a means through which 
they can meet, share information on matters of mutual interest and can coordinate their positions 
on these issues.  In this sense, these mechanisms provide an important information service to 
their participating countries.  It should be noted that, at least in the case of the G20and the G24 




The IEGs involved in international financial governance perform regulatory functions in the 
sense that they oversee the operation of the global monetary and financial systems and encourage 
participating states to adopt policies and practices for themselves and their financial institutions 
that are consistent with the effective operation of these international systems. Their regulatory 
authority tends to be ―soft‖ because they do not have the power to legally enforce compliance 
with their decisions.  In addition, many of the IEGs’ decisions and the regulatory standards and 
codes that they support are drafted in such a way that they provide financial regulatory 











authorities with a reasonable amount of discretion in their interpretation and implementation. 
However, as will be described below, some of the IEGs have ways of compelling their member 




The international institution that is most prominently involved in regulation is the IMF. At the 
time of its creation, its member states agreed to establish a rule-based international monetary 
system, pursuant to which each member state agreed to maintain a fixed value for its currency, 
known as the currency’s par value.
 90
  The IMF was assigned the responsibility for overseeing 
this par value system.  
 
The IMF’s primary tool for exercising this oversight, or regulatory, function was, and continues 
to be, its surveillance operations. Pursuant to Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, the IMF 
was expected to meet regularly with each member state to review its monetary policies. The 
purpose of this review was to ensure that the member state was following policies that were 
consistent with the maintenance of the par value of its currency. During these consultations, the 
IMF would advise the member state about it views on these policies. It is important to note that, 
in principle the member state was free to accept or reject this advice.  
 
The persuasive power of the IMF’s advice was enhanced in two ways. First, the IMF would 
report to its Board of Directors on its findings from these surveillance missions. This enabled the 
IMF to mobilize peer pressure at its Executive Board level to persuade the member state to 
follow the IMF’s policy recommendations.  
 
Second, all member states knew that, if they were forced to turn to the IMF for financial support, 
the IMF’s advice would inform the conditionalities it attached to the financial support. Given 
that during the par value system, all types of member states used the IMF’s financing facilities, 
this possibility gave a certain persuasive force to IMF advice to all its member states.  
 
The IMF would also use the information it learned in the course of all its surveillance missions to 
inform the international community about its views on the operation of the international 
monetary system. This was done through publishing the World Economic Report, which contains 
the IMF’s view on the global economy and its likely future direction. One key input into the 
report is the information that the IMF learns on these surveillance missions.  
 
Over time, the IMF’s regulatory powers have evolved, particularly following the collapse of the 
par value system in the 1970s.  This collapse and the subsequent move to an international system 
of floating exchange rates, based on foreign exchange markets, changed IMF surveillance in two 
ways. First, the increased importance of foreign exchange markets, enabled rich countries to gain 
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more control over their international monetary policy and to free themselves from the need for 
IMF financing. However, the increased volatility in exchange markets resulted in poor countries 
becoming more reliant on either IMF financing or on IMF support to access other sources of 
funds.  The net effect of these developments was, on the one hand, to weaken the force of the 
IMF’s regulatory powers in regard to its rich member states and, on the other hand, to strengthen 
its authority over its poorer member states.  
 
Second, the scope of the IMF’s regulatory powers in regard to the poorer member states were 
expanded by the fact that the range of issues likely to affect the value of the member state’s 
currency and its balance of payments was much larger under the new system than it had been 
under a par value system. Thus, IMF surveillance missions began to cover a broader range of 
issues now than used to be the case under the par value system. This in turn has resulted in the 
IMF attaching a broader range of conditions to its financing than used to be the case. These 
conditions now include issues such as financial sector governance, fiscal policy, budgetary 




The IMF’s regulatory authority has begun to evolve again. In fact, it seems to be regaining some 
regulatory power over all its member states as financial sector regulatory issues have become 
more important relevant to the functioning of the international monetary system, which is the 
IMF’s original area of jurisdiction. The IMF, in its Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), undertaken with the World Bank and in its Reports on Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSCs) evaluates how well its member states’ regulatory systems compare to the 12 
standards and codes discussed above and advises them on what it needs to do to bring these 
systems into conformity with these standards.  To date, the IMF has conducted financial sector 




It should be recognized that the IMF’s enhanced regulatory role raises an important issue 
concerning decision making by the IMF in regard to its regulatory function. As we saw in 
module 2, not all IMF member states participate equally in its decision making process. This 
creates a risk that its regulatory decisions are based on considerations and standards and codes 
that are not fully responsive to the concerns of all its member states and stakeholders.  
 
The multilateral development banks play a less powerful regulatory role in international financial 
governance. However, the credit allocation decisions they make and the conditions that they 
attaches to their policy based financing do have a regulatory impact. Both of these types of 
decisions can influence the way in which their member states respond to international financial 
regulatory initiatives. In addition, the MDBs support regulatory development through their 
participation in the FSAP.  The same governance concerns about the IMF’s role in regard to the 
FSAP are applicable to the World Bank, and, to a lesser extent, to the regional MDBs.  
 
The WTO is not an active participant in the regulatory arrangements for international financial 
governance. However, it does play some role because it is the forum in which the international 
community meets to agree on terms for trade in financial services. Through the decisions taken 
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in this regard, the WTO can influence international financial governance, even though its 
decisions regarding trade in financial services are driven more by international trade concerns 
than by international financial governance considerations. This influence can be enhanced 
because of the fact that WTO agreements can be enforced through the WTO dispute settlement 
procedures
93
, This creates some risk that certain international financial regulatory issues—for 
example, relating to the ability of financial institutions to establish a commercial presence in 
other countries—can be determined in the WTO which may not take into account all the relevant 
international financial governance considerations.  
 
The BIS plays an important indirect regulatory role. By hosting regular meetings of the heads of 
its member central banks, it helps its members coordinate their regulatory and policy responses 
to international financial developments.  Further, its committees
94
, including the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems and the BCBS, which it hosts, play critical roles in developing 
some of the key financial regulatory standards and codes in international financial governance.  
Since, these standards and codes have implications for all countries, it is concerning that the 
committees in which they are developed have restricted memberships and do not have any 
formal mechanisms for incorporating the views of other stakeholders.
95
   
 
Entities Involved in Coordinating Regulation of Financial Institutions 
 
The first point to note about these entities is that they do not have the authority or power to 
develop legally binding and enforceable standards and codes. This means that they cannot force 
either states or the regulatory authorities in those states to adopt and implement these standards 
and codes. They also cannot hold them liable for failing to incorporate these standards and codes 
into the national financial regulatory framework.  These entities’ regulatory role, therefore, is 
limited to developing guidelines and standards, which they expect each of their participating 
members to incorporate into their national law.  
 
While their regulatory role may lack legal enforceability, these entities are still capable of 
playing a significant role in international financial regulation. A good example of the importance 
of the regulatory significance of these entities is the 2006 ―International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards‖ known more colloquially as the ―Basel II Framework:‖
96
 
These detailed and technical standards set out a framework for regulating the capital adequacy of 
banks. It establishes minimum capital standards for banks that are based on a risk adjusted 
evaluation of their assets. The Basel II Framework also sets out a framework for monitoring this 
capital adequacy that is based on a supervisory review process and on market discipline. The 
Basel II Framework was developed by the representatives from the 25 countries that participate 
in the BCBS. It was intended to be an updated and improved version of the capital adequacy 
standards that the BCBS had developed in 1988. It was slowly developed over a number of years 




 The BIS has the following committees:  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; the Committee on the 
Global Financial System; the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems ;  the Markets Committee and  the 
Irving Fisher Committee on Central Bank Statistics 
95






and involved consultations with banking regulatory authorities around the world, key financial 
institutions, and banking industry representative bodies. Thus by the time they were finalized 
many but not necessarily all interested parties had participated in the process. Consequently, the 
BSBC was confident that they would be implemented by national regulatory authorities around 
the world and that they would be utilized by the IMF and the World Bank in their FSAP and 
ROSC work. In fact, regulatory authorities in many countries had or were in the process of 
implementing the Basel II Framework when the international financial crisis erupted. The crisis 
exposed some shortcomings in the Basel II Framework, which relied on self regulation and on 
the judgements of credit ratings agencies. During 2009, the BCBS has made adjustments in the 
Basel II Framework. However, in light of the financial crisis and the adjustments being made to 
the framework, a number of states may slow down their implementation of the Framework. 
Given its nature, they can do so without legal consequence.  
 
The Basel II Framework also highlights another aspect of the regulatory function of these 
entities. It was developed by banking regulatory authority representatives from the BCBS’s 25 
members
97
. In doing so they had in mind the banking systems in their countries.  Most of these 
countries have both large transnational banks and smaller nationally and locally focused banks 
that together serve the needs of the vast majority of their population. In addition, they are all 
active participants in international financial markets. Consequently, they developed capital 
adequacy standards that were applicable to their banking and financial systems and their needs. 
However, most of these countries do not have large sectors of their populations that are poor and 
unbanked. Similarly, they do not have large sectors of their populations that are constrained by 
religious principles in how they use banking systems. Thus, the resulting Basel II Accords are 
not necessarily the most appropriate capital adequacy standards for all countries. However, 
because they are utilized by the IMF and the MDBs in their work, they have become the standard 
that guides banking regulation in all their member states.  
 
The Basel II Framework is not atypical. A number of other regulatory initiatives, at entities like 
IOSCO and IAIS, are also developed through processes which, while more open than the BCBS, 
may not be fully responsive to the needs of all states. For example, the 2009 IOSCO regulatory 
reform proposals dealing with unregulated financial markets
98
 are designed to deal with the 
problems created by the off-balance sheet derivatives that contributed to the 2008-09 financial 
crisis in major financial centres and their impact on these centres rather than with all the 
problems that these instruments might create for markets in poorer countries. Similarly, the 
IAIS’s ―Insurance Core Principles and Methodology‖
99
 provides a useful set of principles for 
guiding insurance regulation but it does not address the challenges of overseeing an insurance 
industry that operates in an environment in which many people lack access to insurance.  
 
It should also be noted that there are a number of coordinating entities that have agreed on 
guidelines and procedures that are designed to encourage more efficient and effective 
development financing. They seek to do this through promoting better coordination between all 
                                                 
97
 The members of the BCBS come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi 




 http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Insurance_core_principles_and_methodology.pdf  
42 
 
the providers of specific forms of international development financing. For example, the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
100
 of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) seeks to ensure better coordination between the different bilateral aid 
agencies of its member states. Similarly, the Berne Union
101
 and the OECD
102
 promote more 
effective standards for the operation of the export credit market. Finally, a number of 
international financial institutions, bilateral aid agencies and recipient countries have agreed on a 
set of guidelines, the 2005 ―Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonization, 
Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability‖
103
  (Paris Declaration) and the 2008 Accra 
Agenda for Action
104
 (Accra Agenda) that seek to ensure that all official development finance is 
provided to recipient countries in a coordinated way that maximizes recipient ownership of their 
own development process and their ability to utilize the funds in ways that are consistent with 
their policies and needs.  
 
Mechanisms for Coordination  
 
It is only the mechanisms, like the G7/8 and the G20, that are interested in playing a role in 
global financial governance that perform a regulatory function. In particular, they seek to guide 
the policy debate and the regulatory initiatives undertaken in regard to international financial 
governance. For example, the G7/8 has historically played an important role in defining the 
policy agenda of the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, it used the Financial Stability Forum 
to try and establish the global regulatory agenda. More recently, it seems that the G20 may be 
taking over the role formerly played by the G7/8.  It has invited all the countries in the G20 to 
join the Financial Stability Forum and has converted it into the Financial Stability Board.  
 
It is important to note, however, that, while the G20 is more representative of the global 
economy than the G7/8, its membership is self-selected and is restricted. Consequently, to the 
extent that it succeeds in its apparent objective of playing the guiding role in international 
financial governance, it will raise important questions about the fairness and adequacy of its 
representation of global interests. Already there are important voices challenges its legitimacy 
and calling for the United Nations to play a larger role in global governance.  
 
C. Financial and Monetary Assistance 
 
The financial and monetary assistance function in international financial governance is limited to 
the key international financial institutions. None of the major entities involved in coordinating 
financial regulation or the coordinating groupings play any direct role in financial and monetary 
assistance. However, it should be noted that a number of the states that participate in 
coordinating groupings like the DAC do provide financial assistance, usually in the form of 
grants, to developing countries.  
 













Both the IMF and the MDBs are actively engaged in providing financing to qualifying member 
states or to entities in these states. They provide financial assistance for a variety of different 
purposes. The IMF only provides its members with financing for balance of payments and 
monetary support. Its financing, which is subject to a range of policy and macro-economic 
conditionalities, is provided to members in the form of general balance of payment and 
budgetary support. They can use the funds for almost any purpose that they consider desirable. 
The IMF provides through a number of different facilities, each of which is designed to deal with 
a specific type of current account problem.
105
 In principle, the facilities should not be used by 
states that are experiencing problems in their capital accounts. The IMF finances these facilities 
from its general resources, supplemented, if necessary from the borrowing facilities that are 




The IMF, provided sufficient member states agree, is also able to provide financial support to all 
its member states by issuing Special Drawing Rights(SDRs).
107
 The member states can use the 
SDRs in specified transactions—with the IMF, some other international financial organizations 
and with other member states. The IMF distributes the SDRs to its member states according to 
their quotas. The IMF has not often issued SDRs. However, in 2009 its members agreed that it 
would issue SDR250 billion in order to assist its member states deal with a global economic 
crisis.  
 
The MDBs were all established to provide financing to development projects in qualifying 
member states. Most of the MDBs provide the financing to their member states or other 
borrowers with a guarantee of the relevant member state.  They may also have divisions or 
affiliates that provide financing to the private sector in their member states.  However, over time 
they have expanded their scope of operations to include policy-based lending as well.
108
 This 
form of financing is similar to IMF financing in the sense that it is provided, subject to 
conditionalities, in the form of general budgetary support and can be used for almost any 
purpose.  
 
The BIS is often called the central bank for central banks because it is able to provide central 
banks with banking services. One important financing function performed by the BIS is to 
provide short term bridge financing to qualifying countries that are facing financial crises.
109
  
The WTO, on the other hand, does not perform any financial assistance function.  
 
It should be noted that there are a number of other institutions that provide international finance 
and that are relevant to international financial governance. They include international 
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organizations, such as the United Nations Development Program
110
 and the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development
111
, as well as bilateral aid programs and export credit agencies.  
 
D. Technical Support 
 
Many of the institutions and entities involved in international financial governance are involved 
either directly or indirectly in providing technical support to their members. ―Direct‖ technical 
support means that the institution or entity itself is explicitly providing a technical support 
service to its member states. For example, the IMF offers training workshops that are specifically 
designed to help develop the technical knowledge and skills of the officials of its member states. 
―Indirect‖ technical support means that the institution or entity provides either capacity building 
or advisory services to its member states in the course of performing some other governance 
function. For example, IOSCO, in undertaking various studies about the functioning of capital 
markets, may assist its members to learn more about the effective operation of capital markets, 




The international organizations involved in international financial governance are all involved in 
providing various forms of direct and indirect technical support to their member states. For 
example, the IMF provides a range of capacity building services to its member states that are 
relevant to financial governance.
112
 It offers training programs for government officials from its 
member countries on a range of technical subjects.  It also provides members with advisory 
services on various monetary and financial policy issues, including drafting of laws and 
regulations on central banking, fiscal and tax policy, payments systems, financial sector 
regulation, and public sector debt and financial management. During its surveillance mission and 
through its publications, it also offers its members some opportunities for obtaining indirect 
technical support.  
 
The MDBs offer member states direct technical support through their advisory and training 
programs.
113
 They also provide indirect technical support in the course of their country and 
project related analytical work.  The BIS’ Financial Stability Institute offers seminars and 
workshops for financial sector supervisors from around the world. 
114
 The WTO offers a range of 
training programs to its member countries.
115
 However these relate more to international trade in 
general than to financial governance in particular.  
 
Entities Involved in Coordinating Regulation of Financial Institutions 
 






 For more information on IMF technical assistance, see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/tech.htm 
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The first point to note about these entities is that the studies and technical standards that they 
develop fulfil an indirect technical support function in the sense that they educate their members 
about the ―best international practice‖ in regard to particular financial governance issues.  In 
addition, the fact that they convene meetings at which regulators from different countries can 
discuss matters of mutual interest and concern, means that they offer these members indirect 





Mechanisms for Coordination  
 
The coordinating mechanisms play no direct role in technical support. However, they may play 
an indirect role in the sense that their meetings and studies do help participants develop their 




The international financial governance system does not have one leading coordinating 
mechanism. However, the IMF and the FSB appear to be assuming leading coordinating roles in 
international financial governance, albeit under the guidance of the G20. It should also be noted 
that, because of the complexity of the international financial system and its governance 




Both the World Bank and the IMF play some coordinating role in international financial 
governance. For example, the World Bank chairs aid coordination groups for some of its member 
states. In this capacity it seeks both to ensure that the country receives adequate financial flows 
and to promote more effective allocation and utilization of international financing within the 
country. It may also play a role in harmonizing the terms and conditions on which this financing 
is provided.   
 
The IMF similarly plays a coordinating role in international finance through its role as the 
―gatekeeper‖ to international financing for some of its member states. This means that the 
financing it offers to its member states and the conditions attached to it are seen by the 
international financial community as evidence that the country is following ―acceptable‖ 
policies. This in turn, is thought to provide them with the necessary comfort to continue their 
own financing operations in the member state concerned. This means in effect that the 
combination of the IMF’s regulatory and financing functions enable it to play a coordinating role 
in regard to the allocation of international financial flows. This role is particularly critical in the 
case of states experiencing debt or international payments crises.   
 
The IMF also uses its ―convening powers‖ to play a larger coordinating role. This refers to its 
ability to bring its member states, or at least sub-groups of them together to discuss matters of 
mutual interest and, if appropriate, agree on coordinated strategies for dealing with common 
problems and challenges.  
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Both the BIS and the WTO do have some coordinating role in the sense that they provide the 
forums in which their members can meet to develop and coordinate policies and agreements on 
issues related to international financial governance.  
 
It should also be noted that coordination in the international financial area is constrained by the 
fact that there are very few formal international agreements pertaining to the governance of 
international development finance in general and to international financial governance in 
particular. Some of the agreements that do exist, for example the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda are not binding, so that the agencies that are parties thereto are relatively free to act this 
lack as they please.
117
 One consequence of this situation is that the flow of development 
financing from official sources can be unpredictable and variable. It also tends to be subject to a 
range of different factors, many of which may not be directly relevant to an efficient and 
equitable allocation of development finance.  
 
Entities Involved in Coordinating Regulation of Financial Institutions 
 
These entities all play an important coordinating role. This necessarily follows from the fact that 
they all are bodies in which national regulators meet to discuss issues of mutual interest and 
concern. Moreover, given that these regulators and their governments do not want to surrender 
their sovereign prerogatives relating to the governance of their financial markets and institutions, 
catoordination between national regulatory authorities is a primary means for promoting 
international financial governance.  
 
It is important to note that this coordination function is not without its challenges. The primary 
challenge is that effective participation in these mechanisms is not equal. In some cases, for 
example the BCBS and the FATF, membership is restricted to certain countries. In other cases, 
for example IOSCO, membership is open to the appropriate securities regulators from any 
country but participation in IOSCO’s key decision making Technical Committee is limited and it 
is dominated by representatives from certain countries. The result is that the coordination tends 
to be biased in favour of the interests of these members. 
 
Mechanisms for Coordination  
 
As a general proposition, one of the key functions of these mechanisms is to provide a means 
through which the participating states can meet, share information on matters of mutual interest 
and can coordinate their positions on these issues.  Thus, it is not too much of an exaggeration to 
state that the raison d’etre of these mechanisms is to provide a coordination service to their 
participating countries.  
 
IX. Summary and Conclusion 
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We have seen in this module that there are five functions that any system of international 
financial governance should be expected to perform. These functions are information and 
analysis, regulation, financial assistance, technical support, and coordination. The above has also 
shown that the IEGs involved in existing arrangements for international financial governance 
collectively perform these five functions. However, it has also shown that there are problems in 
connection with the performance of these functions.  
 
First, there is no lead entity in regard to each of the five functions. This suggests that these 
functions are performed without effective leadership. This creates a risk that these functions are 
being inefficiently performed. In addition, it is possible that there is both duplication and under-
coverage in the performance of these functions.  
 
Second, there are problems in terms of the decision-making processes associated with the 
performance of these functions. This raises concerns about the efficacy with which the functions 
are being performed. They also increase the possibility that the functions are being performed in 
ways that over-emphasize the interests of certain stakeholders in the current international 
financial system and undervalue the interests of other stakeholders.  
 
These problems thus suggest that there is a need for reform of the current arrangements for 
international financial governance. This is the subject on which we focus in the fourth module.  
 
 
Module 4: Reforming Global Financial Governance 





We saw in module 1 that any system of international financial governance should have two 
objectives. The first is to support an international monetary system that is predictable and stable 
and that facilitates payments for international economic transactions. The second is to oversee an 
international financial system that both protects the interests of savers and investors around the 
world and allocates credit efficiently and fairly amongst all potential borrowers.  We also saw 
that any arrangement for international financial governance will only effectively achieve the 
requisite objectives if they conform to the following five sets of principles: holistic approach to 
development, comprehensive coverage, respect for applicable international law, coordinated 
specialization, and good administrative practice.  
 
It is clear that the current international financial governance arrangements have not produced a 
predictable and stable financial system that efficiently and fairly allocates finance around the 
world.  Consequently, there is general agreement amongst all stakeholders that these 
arrangements need to be reformed.  
 
This module focuses on the efforts that have been undertaken in recent years to reform 
international financial governance. It encourages readers to think about the costs and benefits of 
these reform efforts and about what additional reform measures could be attempted in the future. 
48 
 
The module is divided into 3parts. The first section will discuss the problems with the existing 
global financial governance arrangements. The second section will focus on the current reform 
efforts.  The third section discusses the potential for additional reform that may exist in the short 
and medium term.  
 
It is important to note that, given the complexity of the subject and the relatively large number of 
entities involved in global financial governance, it is not possible for this module to provide a 
comprehensive discussion of the problems with each of the institutions, entities and grouping 
involved in international financial governance (IEGs or financial IEGs). Readers who are 
interested in learning about the problems with specific financial IEGs should refer to the sources 
and websites cited in the bibliographies at the end of this module and the other modules in this 
course.   
 
I. What are the problems with the institutions of international financial governance? 
 
Using the five principles articulated above, it is possible to identify the key problems with the 
existing international financial architecture.  
 
A. Holistic vision of development 
 
The two most significant financial IEGs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
118
, and the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB)
119
, do not explicitly embrace a vision of development in their 
founding documents. The IMF’s mandate, as set out in its Articles of Agreement
120
, is to 
promote stable international monetary arrangements, which it now interprets as including some 
role in the oversight of international financial markets. However, its Articles do not make any 
explicit reference to development and it has no formal responsibility for promoting development. 
Moreover, it interprets its Articles of Agreement as precluding it from dealing with certain 
aspects of a holistic vision of development, for example it does not take political considerations 
into account in its policies and operations. The FSB’s mandate is limited to financial regulation 
and the coordination of such regulation among its participating members.  
 
Thus, it is clear that these entities are constrained in their ability to incorporate a holistic vision 
of development into their operations by their mandates. This can only change if their members 
amend their mandates or they incorporate the decisions and views of the other international 
organizations that deal with other aspects of development into their decision-making and 
operations.  
 
B. Comprehensive coverage 
 
The current international financial governance arrangements are not comprehensive because they 
suffer from problems of under-inclusiveness in both a regulatory and a participatory sense. There 
are three aspects to regulatory under-inclusiveness. First, the existing multilateral regulatory 
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bodies do not cover all the relevant categories of actors in the international financial system.
121
  
Some national banking regulators meet at the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
(BCBS).
122
 Many capital market regulators meet in the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO)
123
 and insurance regulators meet in the International Association for 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).
124
 However, there is no currently existing international institution 
or mechanism for coordinating regulation of such relatively new actors in the system, like hedge 
funds, private equity funds and sovereign wealth funds, that make up the so-called ―shadow 
banking‖ system that played such a critical role in the creation of the 2008 financial crisis. This 
lack of international coordination is a consequence of the fact that there is, currently, limited 
national regulation of the shadow banking system or of credit rating agencies. However, the net 
effect of this situation is that the current institutional arrangements for international financial 
governance are incomplete and important financial actors fall outside the scope of the 
arrangements that do exist.  It should be noted that this is likely to change as national regulatory 
regimes are adjusted to incorporate the shadow banking system.  
 
Another aspect of regulatory under-inclusiveness is that there are financial instruments that are 
important in terms of their market role and total value but that are not covered by the  existing 
international arrangements.
125
 For example, many credit derivatives were until very recently 
relatively unrelgulated in such key jurisdictions as the US or Europe. As a result, there is also 
inadequate regulatory attention to these instruments at the international level. This may change 
as national financial regulation is reformed.  
 
The final aspect of regulatory under-inclusiveness is that the global regulatory bodies sometimes 
rely on self regulation by the entities that they are expected to regulate. For example, the 2006 
―International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards‖ known more 
colloquially as the ―Basel II Framework‖
126
 allow qualifying banks to develop their own risk 
assessment models and to base their capital requirements on these models. These guidelines also 
rely on the decisions of the credit ratings agencies regarding specific transactions. This situation 
results in under-regulation because it allows self-interested parties to make decisions that affect 
their own capital requirements.  
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Participatory under-inclusiveness is concerned with the operating principles of the international 
regulatory bodies themselves rather than with their activities.
127
 In particular, it refers to the fact 
that not all national regulatory bodies are able to participate in decision making at the global 
level. For example, only 25 countries
128
 participate in the BCBS, even though the Basel II 
Framework and the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
129
  that it developed, in 
fact, are applicable globally.  
 
Similarly, while IOSCO has more general membership, its Executive Committee has established 
two important working groups: a Technical Committee and an Emerging Markets Committee.  
The Technical Committee, most of whose members come from the G10 countries, including two 
each from the US and Canada, is responsible for developing and overseeing the regulatory issues 
and standards of interest to the world’s most liquid and sophisticated financial markets.
130
  While 
its proposals are submitted to the Emerging Markets Committee and the Executive Committee 
before being shown to the full membership, the Technical Committee is the forum in which the 
bargaining and the shaping of issues takes place. As a result, de facto, only the Technical 
Committee members participate in the identification of issues for consideration by the IOSCO 
membership and they play the leading role in formulating its responses to these issues. A third 
example is the FSB which is the key global forum for coordinating financial regulation and for 
discussion of global financial regulatory policy but its formal membership is limited to regulators 
from the G20 countries.  
 
A final more complex example is the IMF and the World Bank, both of which help transmit the 
standards established in the more technical regulatory bodies to all their member states.
131
 While 
they have universal membership, these organizations do not offer all states meaningful 
participation in their decision making. This follows from their weighted voting system, and the 
structure of their Board of Directors. For example, Belgium has more votes in the IMF than 
Brazil; and Sub-Saharan African countries, which are big consumers of the services of the World 
Bank and the IMF, currently have two representatives on their Boards, while Western Europe has 
eight.    
 
The current arrangements also have a second participatory under-inclusiveness. They are under-
inclusive in the sense that that they do not provide for effective participation by all relevant and 
interested stakeholders. Consequently, in addition to the problems with participation by state 
representatives discussed above, many of the IEGs do not provide an effective means for 
participation by all the various non-state actors who have an interest in financial regulation and 
governance. This is a particularly significant problem at the ―low end‖ of the system in the sense 
that both the institutions dealing with poverty and poor people themselves have inadequate 
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means for participating in international financial governance, despite the profound impact of 
international financial decisions on their lives. 
 
An important aspect of comprehensive coverage is subsidiarity. In the case of international 
financial governance, this means deferring to national regulators to the greatest extent possible 
and, when international level regulation is necessary, ensuring that it provides for maximum 
feasible national implementation and interpretation. The current international financial 
governance arrangements satisfy the requirement of subsidiarity for some member states and not 
for others. In the case of the rich and powerful states, the arrangements are very respectful of 
their need for making, to the greatest extent feasible, their own financial regulatory policies and 
their own monetary and financial policies. Consequently, the bodies in which they participate 
most actively—the BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, FSB etc. – tend to be bodies which depend on national 
implementation of their standards for their efficacy. This means that while these bodies develop 
standards that they expect all their members to implement, their decisions are non-binding and it 
is up to each state to decide for itself whether or not to incorporate the international standard into 
their domestic regulatory regime. They are also able to interpret and apply the international 
standard in the way that is most congenial for them. While there are likely to be adverse market 
consequences for any participating state and their financial institutions and borrowers that do not 
follow the international standards, there will be no legal consequences.  
 
On the other hand, weak and poor countries do not have the same degree of discretion in regard 
to these international standards, despite the fact that they have usually played a limited or even 
no role in developing them. There are two reasons for this. First, the international financial 
governance institutions on which they are most dependent for financing --- the World Bank and 
the IMF—tend to support the key international regulatory standards and to advocate for their 
adoption by all their member states. Second, these institutions are able through the conditions 
attached to their financial support, de facto, to compel weak and poor states to adopt and 
implement standards. Thus, these poor and weak states end up having less policy discretion than 
the richer and more powerful member states.  
 
C. Respect for applicable international legal standards 
 
The relevant international legal standards tend to be generally applicable and do not include 
provisions that are specifically designed to apply to international financial governance. The 
result is that it is not always clear how the financial IEGs should interpret or implement these 
principles.  
 
Compliance with certain applicable international legal principles is relatively non-controversial.  
The key institutions of international financial governance are formally respectful of the national 
sovereignty of their member states. They appear to formally respect the principle of non-
discrimination in regard to the member states, in that they do not actively discriminate between 
states to the detriment of any state. Third, they appear to pay attention to the rights of legal 
persons, particularly financial institutions in their activities and policies.  
 
The remaining areas of concern, therefore, are their respect for the rights of natural persons and 
their compliance with international environmental legal standards.  At a minimum, their 
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compliance should manifest itself in some discussion of these issues in the policy and operational 
documents of the financial IEGs. This would indicate that attention has been paid to these issues 
and how they affect financial regulation and financial transactions. It is very difficult to find any 
indication that attention has been paid to them in the documents of the key regulatory bodies—
the BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, FSB or the Bank for International Settlements
132
 (BIS).  
 
On the other hand, some attention is paid to these issues by the international financial 
institutions. The World Bank addresses environmental law and some human rights issues in its 
safeguard policies.
133
 However, these policies, which deal with how the Bank should address 
social, cultural, and environmental concerns in its operations, do not explicitly require the Bank 
to assess the human rights impacts of Bank operations and so are not comprehensive in their 
coverage of human rights issues. The IMF acknowledges the relevance of some human rights 
issues to the challenges of governance.
134
 Yet, like the Bank, it does not explicitly or 
comprehensively evaluate the human rights impacts of its policies or operations.   
 
D. Coordinated specialization 
 
There are a number of IEGs that have specialized responsibilities in international financial 
governance. They include the IMF, the World Bank, the FSB, the BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS, and the 
BIS. In addition, the World Trade Organization is responsible for facilitating development of 
international rules and standards for trade in services, including financial services. Each of these 
entities has, prima facie, clear and well defined specialized areas of expertise and their mandates 
are confined to these limited areas. Issues outside their defined areas of expertise are assumed, in 
principle, to be the responsibility of other non-financial international institutions and entities 
(non-financial IEGs), including the various United Nations specialized agencies.  
 
This arrangement faces two significant challenges, First, the envisaged clear division of 
responsibility has not been maintained in the case of the major, international financial 
institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. The dynamics of their work tend to push them to see 
connections between their areas of responsibility and other substantive issues, even if these fall 
within the mandate of non-financial IEGs. Thus, over time, both the World Bank and the IMF 
have expanded their scope of work to include aspects that were outside their original 
mandates.
135
  A good example is the way in which the Bank and the IMF have both come to 
address issues like good governance as they have seen how these issues affect the developmental 
or international monetary affairs of their member states. However, their concern with these 
issues, because it is filtered through their specific mandate, is not comprehensive and has a 
certain ad hoc quality.  
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This ―mission creep‖ in addition to taxing the Bank’s and the Fund’s resources, credibility and 
ultimately legitimacy, also weakens other international organizations. The reason is that these 
other organizations, while they may formally have the authority to act in certain areas, lack the 
financial and political means to offer serious counterweights to the financially powerful IMF and 
World Bank.  
 
Second, there is not effective coordination either between the various financial IEGs or between 
these financial IEGs and the non-financial IEGs. In the case of the financial IEGs coordination is 
expected to come from the G20 working with the IMF and the FSB. However, as we have seen, 
there are problems of representation and participation in the decision making structures of these 
organizations, which undermine their ability to be effective coordinators. In addition, while the 
IMF has considerable leverage over its poorer and weaker member states, its influence over its 
rich and powerful member states is limited. In addition, the IMF does not have any formal 
mechanisms for getting the World Bank and the other international financial institutions to 
follow its lead. Consequently, its ability to be an effective coordinator is limited.  The FSB has 
even more limited authority in the sense that it has no means to compel the various state and 
institutional participants to implement its decisions or to follow its lead. Each is free to decide 
for itself if and how to implement the decisions, standards and codes supported by the FSB.  It 
has even less direct ability to force its views onto non-participating states—although the IMF 
does assist in this regard.  
 
The international order created after the Second World War did include a coordinating 
mechanism for all the United Nations’ specialized agencies, including the IMF and the World 
Bank. The Economic and Social Council is supposed to be the body where these different 
specialized agencies could come together to coordinate their activities
136
. However, this 
coordination has not functioned effectively, in large part because the specialized financial 
agencies are able to use their financial power to overwhelm other international organizations in 
almost any sphere that they choose to operate.  For example, if the World Bank decides that, in 
order to effectuate its development mandate, it should support health related projects, it is able to 
allocate substantial amounts of money for such projects. Similarly, when the IMF, through the 
conditions it attaches to its finance, requires its member states to cut expenditures in ways that 
impact on health, it indirectly becomes a key influence over its member states’ health sector. The 
result is that those states which are interested in developing their health sector are more likely to 
turn to the World Bank or the IMF than to the World Health Organization, with its relatively 
small budget, for advice and support in their health related activities and policies. This situation 
inevitably undermines the position of the WHO, which is supposed to be the UN specialized 
agency responsible for health. The IMF and World Bank have had similar effects in regard to 
other UN agencies, for example those dealing with agriculture, children, and education.   
 
The result is that over time a distortion has appeared in the international governance system in 
the sense that the financial institutions have grown in power and resources while the non-
financial ones have declined.  The net effect is that international financial governance is not 
effectively coordinated with other areas of global governance. The situation is exacerbated by the 
fact that some of the key actors in international financial governance are not part of the UN 
system. For example the FSB is not a UN agency. 
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E. Good administrative practices 
 
The basic principles of good administrative practice in global governance are the same as those 
applicable to any public institution. These principles are transparency, predictability, 
participation, reasoned decision making, and accountability.  This means that all the financial 
IEGs  must conduct their operations in a manner that is sufficiently open that their procedures, 
decisions, and actions are predictable and understandable to all stakeholders. They must also 
offer these stakeholders some meaningful way of raising their concerns and having them 
addressed by the institutions. The institutions should also give reasons for their decisions and 
actions to all interested stakeholders. Finally, the stakeholders should be able to hold the 
institutions accountable for their decisions and actions.  
 
Finance, which is so dependent on confidence and faith, is not an activity that lends itself easily 
to all the principles of good administrative practice. It has no problem with the principles of 
predictability, since this is essential to the functioning of finance. Similarly, at least as a general 
proposition, it can satisfy the principle of reasoned decision making because all key actors in the 
financial system need to understand the decisions of regulators and other key players in 
international financial governance, if they are to act in conformity with these decisions. 
However, the principles of transparency, participation, and accountability are more challenging 
for the international financial governance institutions. Consequently, the remainder of this 




The mechanisms for international financial governance have attempted to adapt to the need for 
transparency.  This is perhaps not surprising, given the need for their information to be shared 
with international financial markets.  
 
The IMF and the World Bank have both significantly improved the transparency of their 
operations in recent years. Their information disclosure policies now require that many of their 
documents are made publicly available as a matter of course and there is greater effort to 
communicate with stakeholders about their policies and operations.
137
 However, they are not 
fully transparent. For example, there are still certain categories of documents, such as their 
archives, that are not easily made publicly available. In addition, the IMF does not have a clear 
set of operational policies and procedures so that it is difficult for interested stakeholders to fully 
understand how they go about doing their business. 
 
The other financial IEGs are reasonably transparent. They share information with their members, 
who often, pursuant to national requirements, will make this information public. They publish 
drafts of their proposed policies and invite comment on the drafts. For example, the BCBS 
published a number of drafts of the Basel II Framework and engaged in extensive discussions 
with key stakeholders about these drafts.  
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The compliance of the institutions of international financial governance with the requirement of 
participation is problematic. The World Bank and the IMF, despite their near-universal 
membership, do not provide for effective participation by all member states. The level of 
member state participation depends on their share of votes in the institution and this is a function 
of each member state’s historical wealth and power. Consequently, as we have seen, there are 
many member states that are under-represented in the organizations and others that are over-
represented.   
 
There is also a participatory deficit in the international regulatory institutions. The reason is that 
these bodies either have restricted memberships (for example the BCBS or the FSB) or, despite 
their open membership policies, have key decision making bodies with restricted memberships 
(for example, the Technical Committee of IOSCO). The result is that a large number of 




The openness of all these organizations to participation by non-state stakeholders is complex. In 
some cases, while they do not formally provide for non-state actor participation in their decision-
making they will consult with key stakeholders. However, the lack of formal consultation 
mechanisms means that other stakeholders may be excluded from the consultation process. For 
example, the BCBS is likely to consult, directly or indirectly, with large private banks and 
organizations representing banks and any other entities that it sees as relevant to its work. Thus, 
informally these consultations are likely to create opportunities for participation by certain 
entities from outside the BCBS member countries in the work of the BCBS. However, since the 
BCBS has discretion in deciding with whom to consult, it is more likely to consult with banking 
organizations than with consumer groups dealing with credit transactions and other civil society 
groups from around the world that have an interest in its work. This lack of participation can be 
mitigated at the national level, if the national law or policies require significant public 




In this context, accountability means that all the stakeholders in international financial 
governance should have some means of holding decision makers responsible for their decisions 
and for their implementation of these decisions.  
 
Using this yardstick, it is clear that the World Bank is the most accountable global financial 
institution.  In addition, to providing its member states with means to raise concerns at the Board 
level, it has a procedure for dealing with complaints about allegedly improper procurement 
awards, and independent entities -- the Inspection Panel and the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman -- for investigating complaints from private parties who allege that they have been 
harmed or threatened with harm by the failure of the members of the Bank Group to comply with 
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their own operational policies and procedures in the projects that they fund.
 139
  It should be 
noted, however, that, while it is possible, for private parties to challenge any World Bank 
operation in the appropriate entity, the complaints, in fact, tend to deal more with project based 
loans than with policy based loans, which may be more directly relevant to international 
financial governance.   
 
The IMF has made some effort to enhance its accountability through the creation of the 
Independent Evaluation Office. This office, which conducts studies of IMF operations, is similar 
to the Independent Evaluation Group in the World Bank. However, it does provide for public 
consultation on its work plan and on the scope of its studies.  
 
The international regulatory bodies are sufficiently different from the IMF and the World Bank 
that it is not reasonable to expect them to be accountable in the same way. Their members are 
regulatory agencies, each of which is accountable to their national governments and, through the 
national administrative procedures, to their various stakeholders. However, the more significant 
concern is that there is no accountability of these regulatory bodies to stakeholders who do not 
participate, either directly or indirectly, in the work of the international regulatory bodies. This is 
particularly significant because the non-participants in these bodies tend to be the poorer and 
weaker states, which nevertheless are compelled either by other multilateral organizations or by 
donor countries to conform to the policies and guidelines of these international regulatory bodies.  
 
II. What reforms have been agreed to?  
 
This section evaluates the recent efforts to reform global financial governance. These efforts can 
be divided into three groups: reforms that have actually been or are being implemented; reforms 
that have been agreed but not yet implemented; and reforms that are still under consideration. 
Each group is considered separately below.  
 
Reforms being implemented 
 
The most noticeable reform is that the G20 has emerged as the primary forum for discussion of 
international financial governance matters.
140
 This is important because it represents an 
acknowledgement of the shift in global power. This change has led to a similar expansion in 
representation in the key international regulatory entity. The Financial Stability Forum, which 
was the forum in which the banking, finance and insurance regulators from the G7 countries plus 
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representatives from international financial institutions like the IMF met to discuss financial 
regulatory matters, has been expanded to include the regulators from all the G20 countries. In 
addition, its status has been enhanced, as exemplified by it changing from a ―forum‖ to a ―board‖ 
named, as we have seen, the Financial Stability Board (FSB). This should result in broader 
participation in deliberations about financial regulation. However, it is not clear that the FSB will 
be more responsive than the FSF to the concerns of low income countries.  
 
There have also been some reforms in the IMF.  The IMF has made some small changes in its 
voting allocations, and has promised additional support to the African members of the Board. 
The IMF has also taken a number of actions that are designed to enhance access to its financing. 
These include reforming its conditionality requirements so that they are more targeted and 
streamlined; eliminating some under-utilized facilities; creating the Flexible Credit Facility and 
the Exogenous Shocks Facility, both of which are only available to member states that meet 




The IMF, with the support of the G20, has also increased its ability to provide financial support 
to its member states.  The G20 member states have provided the IMF with an additional $500 
billion.
142
 These contributions, in the case of those member states that participate in the New 
Agreement to Borrow (NAB)
143
 are in the form of loans through the NAB. In other cases, for 
example Russia and China, the contributions are made through the purchase of an unprecedented 
issue of IMF notes
144
.  Both the NAB loans and the note purchases will only result in temporary 
increases in the resources of the IMF. They will also not result in the states that contribute these 
resources gaining any permanent increase in voting power in the IMF.  
 
Third, the G20 agreed that the IMF should sell some of its gold reserves
145
 to funds to build an 
endowment for its administrative costs and provide (approximately $6 billion) concessional 
funds for the poorest developing countries.  
 
The IMF member states have also agreed to the IMF making an allocation equivalent to USD250 
billion in SDRs to its member state.
146
 (Special Drawing Rights are created by the IMF to 
provide member states with additional liquidity
147
.)  Pursuant to its rules, the IMF must allocate 
SDRs among all its members according to their quotas in the IMF.  Consequently, the richest 
countries will receive the biggest share of the allocation. Developing countries will receive the 
equivalent of about USD100 billion of the total allocation, of which low income countries get the 
equivalent of about USD19 billion.  
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Similarly, the WB has agreed to increase its lending over the next three years.
148
  It has also 
agreed to create a third chair for an African Executive Director. However, to date the African 
countries have not decided how they will reconstitute themselves to take advantage of this new 
chair.  
 




The reforms that have been proposed but not yet implemented include an agreement that in the 
future the Managing Director of the IMF and the President World Bank will be selected on the 
basis of merit and not nationality.  Until now there has been a practice that the head of the IMF is 
always a European and the head of the World Bank is always from the USA. This agreement will 
only be tested when there is a need to select a new leader for one of these organizations. 
 
 The G20 also agreed to implement all the voice and vote reforms agreed in 2008 and to advance 
the quota review scheduled for 2013 to no later than January 2011. Despite their agreement, it is 
unclear when and if these reforms will be implemented. The key problem is that the European 
states that are ―over-represented‖ in the organization are unlikely to surrender their votes (and 
therefore agree to quota reforms) without compensation and, to date, it is unclear how they can 
be adequately compensated.
 150
   
 
Reforms still under consideration 
 
The most significant of the reforms still under consideration are the recommendations of the high 
level panels appointed to review the governance of the IMF (the Manuel Committee
151
) and of 
the World Bank (the Zedillo Committee).  In the case of the Manuel Committee, the 
recommendations on IMF governance reform include changing the requirement that the five 
largest member states have their own Executive Director, changing the scope of IMF 
surveillance to make it more comprehensive, and changing the majority voting rules to eliminate 
the US veto. The first and third of these proposals require amendments to the IMF Articles. Since 
adoption of such amendments requires parliamentary approval in many member states, it is very 
difficult to predict if and when they will actually be implemented. One indicator:  it took 12 
years for the Fourth Amendment to the IMF Articles to receive the 85% majority needed for its 
adoption.
152
 The Zedillo Committee has not yet issued its report.   
 
III. What more can be achieved? 
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A.  Short Term Prospects 
 
In evaluating the potential for further reform efforts in the short run, it is necessary to pay careful 
attention to the constraints within which these reforms must be achieved. There are two issues 
that are relevant in this regard.  
 
First, we are undergoing a shift in power in the global political economy. Currently, the ―rising 
powers‖, as typified by the BRICs
153
,  are not powerful enough to successfully demand 
substantial reform of global financial governance arrangements and the ―declining powers‖, 
primarily the G7 countries, can still block changes that are not to their liking. Thus, the rising 
powers have only succeeded in obtaining marginal changes in IMF quotas, and the rise of the 
G20 has not yet led to the demise of the G7.  This suggests that it is not feasible in the short run 
to reform any faster or further than the current major powers are willing to accept. This may 
change over time as power shifts more towards the newly rising powers but at the moment this is 
an important constraint.  Another consequence of the current situation is that the present 
governance reform process is unlikely to result in sustainable and stable changes in international 
financial governance because these reforms will always be subject to new pressures and 
constraints as the shift in global power plays itself out.   
 
Second, the G20 have been selective in the issues that they address in their reform efforts. Thus, 
while they have addressed some regulatory issues and some governance issues, they have not 
addressed any of the inter-linked issues. These include climate change, poverty alleviation and 
inequality, all of which impact global financial flows and financial regulation. Consequently, 
failure to include them in the discussions on international financial governance undermines 
current efforts to sustainably reform the global financial governance regime.  
 
These constraints suggest that the potential for significant additional reform efforts in the short 
run are limited—especially as the global economy begins to grow again and the pressure 
imposed by the recession declines. They even seem to indicate that the prospects for 
implementation of the agreed but not yet implemented reforms are uncertain.  
 
Given the current situation, in the short run there are only two areas in which there is scope for 
additional reform. The first is financial regulatory reforms. While these reforms are likely to 
have their greatest impact at the national level, they could result in some changes in governance 
at the global level.  The second is in enhancing accountability of the IMF. The reason is that it is 
currently the only major multilateral financial institution that does not have some independent 
accountability mechanism. It is important to note that the IMF can create such a mechanism 
without having to amend its Articles of Agreement and without any action beyond the level of its 
Board of Executive Directors. The history of these mechanisms in other IFIs, like the World 
Bank, suggests that they have can have a positivn impact on the working of the institutions.  
  
B.  Medium Term Prospects 
 
The constraints that limit reform efforts in the short run should not be applicable over the 
medium term. The reason, as indicated above, is that the force of these constraints is likely to 
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weaken over time. Consequently, when contemplating medium term reform efforts, it is 
reasonable to think more laterally and to re-imagine the arrangements for international financial 
governance.  
 
This is not the appropriate occasion to spell out the arrangements for a new international 
financial governance regime in great detail. Suffice it to say that such a regime can take many 
forms as long as it conforms to the key principles set out in the first section of this module. This 
means that the regime must be comprehensive in its coverage. It must also be based on a holistic 
vision of development that both guides the implementation of its specialized technical mandate 
and ensures that there is an effective means for coordinating its activities with those of other 
institutions of global governance. It must also conform to all applicable international legal 
standards, and to the principles of good administrative practice.  
 
The functions that the  IEGs of international financial governance regime must provide include 
being a global lender of last resort, global monetary regulator, provider of global development 
finance; a facilitator of  fair trade in services; a sovereign debt workout mechanism, a means for 
dealing with complex cross boarder bankruptcies, a global financial regulator, which promotes, 
in addition to financial efficiency and innovation, fair financial systems that ensure access for all 
to financial services, appropriate consideration of environmental and social risk; and an efficient 
and fair global tax system.  
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this module we have briefly reviewed the principles that should guide any system of 
international financial governance. We have also considered the problems that exist in the 
current arrangements for international financial governance. Finally, we reviewed the current 
efforts to reform these arrangements and saw that these efforts are still a ―work in progress‖, in 
the sense that some elements have already been implemented, some are in the process of being 
implemented and some are ―yet to be‖ implemented. In addition, we saw that there is still some 
scope for reform in the short run. 
 
However, we also saw that the existing arrangements are reflections of the current balance of 
forces in the international arena. Moreover, the global balance of forces are shifting relatively 
rapidly and it is unlikely that stable arrangements for international financial governance can be 
achieved before these forces resolve themselves. This suggests that in the short term there will be 
limited opportunities for substantial reform of the international financial governance system. 
However, it is likely that as the balance of forces continue to evolve opportunities for reform in 
the existing arrangements will arise. Developing country governments and their citizens should 
be looking out for these opportunities and should use them to try and create enhanced roles for 
smaller and weaker countries in international financial governance. Such opportunistic reform 
efforts, over time, can lead to progressively more space for reform and more opportunity for 
improvements in international financial governance.  
 
We have also seen that over the medium term, it could become possible to undertake more 
substantial changes in international financial governance. However, if these medium-term 
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changes are to be sustainable and supportive of equitable development, they will need to be 
consistent with the principles discussed in this module.  
 
